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ABSTRACT 
 
The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam and Indonesia are using a hedging strategy to 
ensure their security. The Philippines is pursuing a dual policy of hedging and 
balancing with the US. Singapore is following a policy of hedging but is verging on 
bandwagoning with the US. All countries are leveraging off ASEAN and its associated 
fora as their first line of defence. While ASEAN and its fora are adequate for dialogue 
they are not effective in solving disputes among ASEAN countries or  between 
ASEAN countries and China. The uncertain military rise of China and territorial and 
maritime disputes with China are causing South East Asian countries to feel insecure. 
While China professes a policy of “Peaceful Development” its actions in 2009 and 
2010 indicated a more aggressive approach to its claims over the entire South China 
Sea that it now states is an area of “core Interest” to China along with Taiwan. South 
East Asian countries are expanding or have plans to expand their defence force 
capability. The US is considered an important actor in guaranteeing South East Asian 
security and keeping China’s territorial ambitions in check in the immediate future. 
The countries of Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore are 
developing strong economic links with China but are keeping their military links at 
arms length while forging closer defence links with the US. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper seeks to answer the question how are South East Asian countries 
ensuring their security in an uncertain Asian security environment due to the rise of 
China as a regional and global power?   
Since the end of the Second World War the security of South East and East Asia has 
been enhanced by the presence of the United States and its hub and spoke military 
alliance system. The growth of Japan and China, and the influence of Russia, has 
been held in check by a system of two triangles that have sort to maintain a balance 
in South East and East Asia. These have been the US, Japan and China triangle and 
the China, US and Russia triangle1. The end of the Cold War in 1989, and the growth 
of China since 1978, have altered these triangles and the balance of power that they 
provided. Russian influence has declined as a result of the breakup of the USSR and 
China’s ability to play the USSR and United States off against each other has been 
lessened. China has experienced significant economic growth and its economy has 
become intertwined with the US and global economies. China’s development has 
seen it become more engaged in international and South East Asian regional affairs. 
China is developing its armed forces and becoming more assertive over its claims to 
sovereignty over Taiwan, the South China Sea and border areas with India. In the 
South China Sea, China has disputes with a number of countries, which has caused 
conflict. The US continues to oppose the reunification of Taiwan with China by violent 
                                               
1 Gilbert Rozman, China’s Quest for Great Power Identity, Orbis, Vol 43 Issue 3 (1999), p384. 
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means and will intervene if China attempts to invade or militarily intimidate Taiwan. 
There is uncertainty over the rise of China and its military intent. Will China continue 
to be a status quo power or will it become revisionist and possibly revanchist to atone 
for the 100 years shame? This uncertainty is causing security issues for South East 
Asian and East Asian countries as well as the US. ASEAN was established in 1967 to 
promote the sovereignty and development of post-colonial countries in South East 
Asia. While it has attempted to address security issues through its sub-fora, it does 
not have a robust multilateral security organisation such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) to provide collective security. 
 
The study of the security situation in South East Asia and East Asia is important 
because of the economic importance of China and the Asia – Pacific region to the 
global economy and international stability and order. Given United States’ interests 
and security agreements in the region, the potential exists for inter-state conflict 
between major powers and the possibility of escalation into a limited nuclear 
exchange.  
 
This paper will briefly cover the International Relations theories of balancing, hedging 
and bandwagoning within the Realist School of thought. The paper will then consider 
the rise of China and the possible alternate futures for China’s rise and their 
implications for South East Asian security and will argue that China’s rise is causing 
foreign and defence policy uncertainty for SEA countries. The United States 
involvement in enhancing Asian security will be considered and the possibility of inter-
state military conflict between China and the United States as a result of United 
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States national interests and regional security alliances. The paper will argue that 
SEA countries are relying on the US to maintain the status quo in SEA and to counter 
China’s rise as a regional power. The paper will then consider Viet Namese, 
Malaysian, Indonesian, Singaporean and Philippines foreign and defence policy, 
relations with the US and China and military force development as a reaction to  
security uncertainty to see what conclusions can be reached on whether they are 
balancing, bandwagoning or hedging as a reaction to China’s rise. 
 
While the paper will take cognisance of security issues in East China, it will not 
consider Japan’s or South Korea’s security issues in any detail. Consideration of 
these countries will be restricted to the impact that their security issues are having on 
South East Asian security. The paper will not consider in any depth the impact of 
international political economy on countries decisions to hedge, bandwagon or 
balance to address the uncertain rise of China. While ASEAN is important for the 
security of SEA, it will not be considered separately but its influence will be woven 
into the case studies used for this paper.  
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
 
The main school of thought on International Relations that can be applied to an 
assessment of security policy in South East Asia (SEA) is the Realist School based 
on the work of Hans Morganthau and other Realist theorists who have built on his 
work. Realists have a pessimistic view of human nature, a conviction that 
international relations are conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately 
resolved by war, a high regard for the values of national security and state survival 
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and a basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is 
compatible to that in domestic political life.2 Humans are characterised as being 
concerned with their own interests in their competitive relations with each other and 
this competitive behaviour occurs between states. International relations take place in 
an anarchical world devoid of world government. There is debate among scholars 
about Western political philosophy’s application to International Relations in Asia. 
Scholars such as David Kang argue that there is an “Asian Way” and follows the 
Constructivist School of International Relations and that this is different from the 
Western experience of International Relations3. This view has some merit but it 
cannot change the fact that South East Asian countries are operating in an anarchical 
world based on the Westphalian sovereign state system that they have all adopted. 
The existence of ASEAN and its supporting forums such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Six Party Talks 
support this argument4. This argument is wrong because the ASEAN forums do not 
provide a robust mechanism for dealing with serious conflict between states and have 
not been effective in addressing security issues between ASEAN states and a more 
assertive China. ASEAN still relies on the US to maintain a balance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific through its political, economic and military presence. Underlying security 
in ASEAN is a Realist approach to security centred on state survival in an anarchical 
world.  There are three Realist International Relations theories that can be applied to 
South East Asian security and how Singapore, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
                                               
2 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen (2007), Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 
3rd Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p60. 
3 David C. Kang (2003), Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks, International Security 
Vol 27 No4, MIT Press, p82. 
4 Nick Bisley (2009), Building Asia’s Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, pp20-21. 
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Philippines are reacting to regional security issues, the uncertain rise of China and 
possible decline of the United State’s hegemony. These are the Realist School 
theories of balancing, bandwagoning and hedging.  
 
Balancing is based on the Realist theory of the Balance of Power. Balancing occurs 
when a group of weaker states decide that the influence and threat posed by a 
stronger state or grouping of states is unacceptable to them. The cost of opposing the 
stronger state or group of states is less than the cost of allowing the dominant state to 
continue unopposed. The objective, according to Hedley Bull is, a state of affairs such 
that no one power is in a position where it is predominant and can lay down the law to 
others5. The chief function of the balance of power is not to preserve peace but to 
preserve the system of states itself. Consequently, the preservation of the balance of 
power requires war when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially 
dominant state cannot be checked6. Hans Morgenthau argued that the principle 
means of establishing or maintaining a balance of power is through military means7. 
To establish and maintain the Balance of Power states form alliances with other 
weaker states to counter the state or states that seek hegemony or domination over 
other states. An example of this alliance system is the alliance between Great Britain 
and European powers against France post the French revolution in 1789 and then 
against the Napoleonic Empire up to 18148. If ASEAN states were balancing one 
would expect the South East Asian (SEA) states to be forming a military alliance such 
                                               
5 Hedley Bull (2002), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (3rd Ed), Columbia University 
Press, New York, p97. 
6 Hedley Bull (2002), p103. 
7 Hans J. Morgrnthau (2006), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (7th Ed), MsGraw Hill, 
Boston, p192. 
8 Hans J. Morgenthau (2006), p199. 
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as the growing NATO alliance in Europe. Such an organisation would have a 
permanent political and military hierarchy with set guidelines for the use of military 
force and command and control mechanisms to counter a threat from a larger power 
such as China.  
 
The term bandwagoning was first used by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942) 
and was reinforced as a concept by Kenneth Waltz in his, “Theory of International 
Politics” (1979). Kenneth Waltz argued that instead of balancing, smaller and weaker 
states joined or bandwagoned with the strong state that threatens them. In 
bandwagoning with the dominant state, weaker states do the opposite of balancing 
which would see the weaker states joining together to counter the larger power that 
threatens them9. The main reason for bandwagoning is that the cost of opposing the 
stronger state exceeds the benefits. David Kang argues that Asian states are not 
balancing against China but that they are bandwagoning with China10. If ASEAN 
states were bandwagoning with China one would expect to see the countries of 
ASEAN establishing closer economic and military ties with China. This system would 
be analogist to the tributary state system where countries kowtowed to China. The 
other significant indicator would be that ASEAN states would start to distance 
themselves militarily from the US to avoid China’s displeasure. 
 
Hedging means that states keep open their strategic options against the possibility of 
a future security threat. Hedging implies that there is a condition of strategic 
                                               
9 Kenneth Waltz (1979), The Theory of International Politics, Addison Westly Publishing Company, Philippines, 
p125. 
10 David C. Kang (2003) Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks, International Security, 
Vol 27 No4, MIT Press, p82. 
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uncertainty and states manage risk by adopting strategies that provide insurance 
against a particular event occurring11. States that are using a hedging strategy seek 
not to antagonise major states unless they become a direct threat to national interests 
and sovereignty. Hedging is used to try and reconcile potentially contradictory 
strategic policies to try and ensure that the contradictory policies achieve the aim of 
ensuring a state’s security. Nick Bisley claims that hedging is a part of many Asian 
states defence and security policies and that hedging is usually associated with their 
reaction to the rise of China as a major economic and military power in the Asia – 
Pacific12. If ASEAN countries are hedging the key indicators would be that states 
would maintain good diplomatic and economic relations with the major powers and 
military relations that fall short of a treaty level military alliance. However, states that 
are hedging would still tend to have a view on who the dominant military power is and 
have a closer security relationship with that power or state. The dominant power for 
ASEAN states is the US and this influences how they manage their relationship with 
China. 
 
CHINA IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 
China’s Foreign Policy  
 
China’s foreign policy is driven by its domestic policy through the concept of “Peaceful 
Development”.13 The foundation of modern Chinese foreign policy was put in place by 
Deng Xiaoping and has been developed by subsequent Chinese leaders. While the 
concept of peaceful development has been put forward, there is still confusion over 
                                               
11 Nick Bisley (2009), p94. 
12 Nick Bisley (2009), p94. 
13 Guoli, Liu. 2008. Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy. Journal of Asian and African 
Studies. Vol 43:5. p543. 
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China’s real security intent toward the Asia-Pacific and how it will deal with its claims 
over Taiwan and the South China Sea. This is affecting Asian and Western 
assessments of China’s true intent and future plans. 
 
China says that its foreign policy goals are: peace and development, that it favours 
multi-polarity, that China will never seek hegemony, that all countries are equal and 
that the UN is the hope for peace and justice in the world.14 These goals follow the 
concept of peaceful development. However, Ross Terrill argues that China’s real 
goals are to: use international relations to shore up the one party state, build up 
wealth and power in a mercantilist fashion, be seen as equal to the US, supplant the 
US as the leading force of Asia and to make the world believe that it needs China.15 
This view appears to be consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s Four Methods for foreign 
policy: behave with confidence and patience, hide our capabilities and bide our time, 
be good at keeping a low profile and never play the leader. China therefore, has a 
global face, which is seen in the present Chinese “charm offensive”, but there is 
underlying doubt that this is the real face of China16. One, therefore, needs to look at 
China’s position on the US, Taiwan and the South China Seas to try to discern their 
real intent. China sees the US as its main obstacle to achieving its objectives in Asia. 
Taiwan and the South China Sea are seen as “core interests” by China and her 
claims to them are, in reality, non-negotiable. 
 
                                               
14  Ross Terrill, (2003), The New Chinese Empire: And what it means for the United States, New York, Basic 
Book,  p.255. 
15  Ibid. 
16 Joshua Kurlantzick, (2006), China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia, Current History, September 2006, 
p276. 
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Sino-US relations have been stable since the US re-established diplomatic relations 
in 1978. US foreign policy toward China will be considered in more detail later in the 
paper. China has examined the lessons of the US/USSR Cold War conflict and 
concluded that Russia made a large mistake by trying to beat the US in the arms race 
that was initiated by the Reagan Administration. Given China’s need to focus on 
economic growth, such an arms race is not considered an option for China. China has 
concluded that it will have to accept US hegemony for some time to come.17 Since 
9/11 China/US relations have stabilized and they share many common interests. 
China has become involved in the Global War on Terror through its need to suppress 
the Uighur separatists.  Problems with the North Korean nuclear weapons programme 
and China’s border security with North Korea have meant that it has joined with the 
US in trying to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The US has, 
since 1978, accepted the “One China Policy” with respect to Taiwan. The major factor 
which joins the US and China is their growing trade and economic interdependence.18 
China’s interdependence with the US will act as a positive force. The real vulnerability 
in the China/US relationship is China’s policy toward Taiwan and the South China 
Sea. 
 
China has always seen Taiwan as part of China. Taiwan is the 23rd Province of China. 
In 1949, Mao Zedong threatened to retake Taiwan but lacked the military capability to 
do so19. In 1972, the Shanghai Communiqué signed by President Nixon and Zhou 
                                               
17 Guoli,Lui, Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy, p.555. 
18 Guoli,Lui, Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy” p.555. 
19 Dick Wilson, (1996),China the Great Tiger: A Nation Awakes, London, Abacus, p.367. 
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Enlai saw the “One China Principle” accepted by US.20 Deng Xiaoping replaced the 
old CCP policy of liberating Taiwan with “peaceful reunification.”21 However, Deng did 
not rule out the use of force to reunify Taiwan with Mainland China if peaceful means 
did not work. This policy has continued and is reflected in the Anti-Secessionist Law 
passed by the National Peoples Congress in March 2005. The Anti Secessionist Law 
states, “The use of force is still an option if the possibility of peaceful reunification 
should be completely exhausted.”22 The eventual reunification of Taiwan with 
Mainland China is seen as non-negotiable by China. While the US recognizes the 
One China Principle, it has signaled to China that it will not accept a forced 
reunification with Taiwan. The US 1979 Taiwan Relations Act calls for the peaceful 
reunification of Taiwan with China with the consent of the Taiwanese people23. 
Taiwan is an issue of sovereignty and revisionism for the Chinese. Taiwan is linked to 
the bigger issue of maintaining the Chinese Empire with implications for Tibet and 
Xinjiang. Taiwan also has a revisionist and revanchist aspect to it. Japan seized 
Taiwan in 1895 and held it as a colony until 1947. The Chinese see this as an insult 
to their hegemony in East Asia. There is debate over why Taiwan is so important to 
the US. The consensus, according to Andrew Kennedy, is that the US uses the 
Taiwan card as a hedge against the rise of China in Asia.24 China’s and the US’s 
position on Taiwan has serious implications for security in East Asia. The issue of 
Taiwan is further complicated by China’s foreign policy over the South China Sea. 
 
                                               
20 Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire, p.214. 
21 Guoli, Lui, “Domestic Sources of China’s Emerging Grand Strategy” ,   p.456. 
22 A.B. Kennedy,  China’s Perception of the US Intentions Toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon. Asian 
Survey. Vol 47(2). p268. 
23 A. Goldstein, Power Transitions, Institutions, and China’s rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and 
evidence. Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol 30:4. p 666. 
24 A.B. Kennedy, China’s Perception of the US Intentions Toward Taiwan, p274. 
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China lays claim to islands and their associated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in 
the East China Sea and South China Sea. In the East China Sea, China claims that 
it’s EEZ expands into the EEZ claimed by Japan and disputes Japan’s ownership of 
the Senkaku Islands. The East China Sea is strategically important because it is 
assessed that it contains seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 100 million 
barrels of oil. In June 2008, China/Japan tensions over the East China Sea were 
eased when both agreed to put their claims on hold and jointly exploit the 
Chunxiao/Shirakba gas field25.  In January 2010, tensions were raised again when 
Japan accused China of exploiting the Chunxiao gas field in contravention of the 
2008 agreement. The PLAN increased its activity in the area to reinforce its claim26. 
However, as China’s appetite for raw materials grows and its military capability 
increases, this state of affairs may not endure.  In the South China Sea, China claims 
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Island Groups. China sees its southern 
border and EEZ encompassing the South China Sea. China’s claims are disputed by 
Brunei, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Viet Nam. In addition to the undersea 
resources in the South China Sea, the Sea Lines of Communication through the area 
affect safe passage for 80% of the oil needed for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
During the 1990s, China expanded its military power projection capability to defend 
claims to islands in the South China Sea. This was seen as a challenge to regional 
order and the US. In 1992, China declared in its “Law on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone” that it laid claim to Taiwan and its islands and the Spratly and 
                                               
25 Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009. Department of Defence Annual Report to Congress. 
Office of the Secretary of Defence.  p5. 
26 China’s Assertiveness at Sea : Choppy Waters, The Economist 21 January 2010. 
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Paracel Islands.27 ASEAN reacted with their own declaration on the South China Sea 
in July 1992 calling for restraint and for disputes to be settled peacefully.  When the 
Chinese fortified Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands ASEAN countries increased their 
security ties to the US. The Chinese approach to the Spratly and Paracel Islands was 
proving to be counter- productive. In the late 1990s, China altered its approach to the 
South China Sea and started supporting regional efforts at institutionalized 
multilateralism.  In 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea was signed to ease tensions in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.28 
This was followed in October 2003 with the Declaration of the Heads of 
State/Government of ASEAN and the Peoples Republic of China on Strategic 
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This represented a move away from bilateral 
treatment of ASEAN countries to a more multilateral approach to find cooperative 
solutions to resource exploitation and a common code of conduct. However, it has 
been argued that China has taken this line to allow it to concentrate on Taiwan and to 
counter US claims that China was becoming a threat to Asian security. In 2010, China 
increased tensions in the South China Sea by saying that the Chinese claims to the 
South China Sea are a “core interest” in line with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang29. The 
disquiet that this claim made on Asia – Pacific countries was not helped by the 
incident in which Japan arrested Chinese fishermen near the disputed Senkaku 
Islands. China reacted angrily and threatened Japan. During the ARF Meeting in 
Hanoi, 12 countries including Viet Nam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei raised 
concerns over China’s action. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stated that 
                                               
27 A. Goldstien, Power Transitions, Institutions, and China’s rise in East Asia, p. 654. 
28 CIA World Fact Book 2009, New York, Skyhorse Publishing, p138. 
29  Strategic Jousting Between China and America : Testing the Waters, The Economist 29 July 2010. 
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the US would support Japan and that they were concerned about disruption to sea 
lines of communication through the South China Sea30. China softened its rhetoric but 
had shown its true intent in the South China Sea. 
 
 China’s approach to its claims over the South China Sea will change as its 
economic and military power increase. China’s military modernization, which will be 
covered in detail later in the paper, is making East Asian and South East Asian 
countries concerned for their on-going security. This lack of clarity in Chinese intent is 
leading to military balance of power hedging by ASEAN countries and the US. 
China’s Defence Developments 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing and increasing its military 
capability to defend the mainland and to conduct denial operations on its periphery 
and into the Western Pacific. These developments appear to run counter to China’s 
foreign policy of “Peaceful Development” and present a challenge to East and South 
East Asian security and US hegemony in the Asia – Pacific Region. The Realist 
perspective is that it is hard to discover a state’s intent so one should focus on 
capability. An assessment of capability leads to the need for other states to increase 
their military capability and to form balances of power through alliances. ASEAN is 
not a military alliance like NATO or even the EU. Consequently, ASEAN relies on 
each state to ensure its own security and negotiate bilateral arrangements with the 
US. A lack of clarity in China’s security intent is leading to hedging by ASEAN 
countries and balancing by the US. This section of the paper will examine China’s 
Defence policy and how it is being interpreted. 
                                               
30 Ian Storey, China’s Missteps in Southeast Asia: Less Charm, More Offensive, China Brief Vol 10 Issue: 25, 
Jamestown Foundation, Washington. 
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While China’s main focus is building its domestic, economy its expenditure on 
Defence continues to rise. China’s GDP in 2000 was $US1.95 trillion and had grown 
to $US4.19 trillion in 200831. This increase in GDP has meant that more funding is 
available for defence expenditure. The Defence budget has grown from $27.9 billion 
in 2000 to $60.1 billion in 2008 and to $US78.6 billion in 200932. Between 2000 and 
2009, China’s defence expenditure grew on average by 11.8% per annum33.  There is 
debate over just how much China spends on defence. Most commentators indicate 
that the real figure is probably two to three times what is officially declared by China. 
Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence for Singapore, 
commented at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2009 that disclosure on military 
expenditure was necessary to provide transparency of military development and to 
avoid misunderstandings between states in SEA.34 This comment was directed at 
China and discloses US and Asian concern over the lack of transparency of Chinese 
military capability increases and the true intent behind these developments. These 
comments indicate that while China has openly published its defence policy in, 
“China’s National Defence 2008”, most countries are still not sure of China’s true 
security intent. 
 
According to the China’s National Defence 2008, “China pursues a national defence 
policy that is purely defensive in nature. China places the protection of national 
                                               
31 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009.  pVII. 
32 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2010, Office of Secretary of Defence, Washington, p41. 
33  Ibid. 
34 Teo Chee Hean, Military Transparency in the Asia Pacific. The Shangri – La Dialogue 2009. 
http://iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2009/ (accessed 16 August 2009). 
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sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national 
development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else”.35 The Defence 
policy objectives are: to uphold national security and unity; ensure the interests of 
national development; achieve the all round development, coordination and 
sustainable development of China’s national defence; enhance the performance of 
the armed forces with informationisation as a major measurement criteria; implement 
the strategy of active defence; pursuing a self-defence nuclear strategy; and foster a 
secure environment conducive to China’s peaceful development.36 The timelines that 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has laid down for the implementation of the 
Defence policy are to lay a solid foundation for the development of the armed forces 
by 2010, accomplish mechanization and major progress in informationisation by 2020 
and reach the goal of moderisation of the national defence and armed forces by the 
mid 21st Century.37   The PLA doctrine for the defence of China has moved from a 
mass army designed for a protracted war of attrition in China to one of what is being 
termed “active defence”. Active defence involves China, fighting short duration, high-
intensity conflict along its periphery against high technology adversaries. The Chinese 
have termed these local wars under conditions of informatisation.38 
 
An analysis of the Chinese Defence White Paper 2008 indicates that for security, 
China has five main goals and these goals drive doctrine and force modernization. 
These goals according to Fravel are: regime security, maintenance of territorial 
                                               
35 China’s National Defence 2008. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 
January 2009. p8. 
36 Ibid. 
37 China’s National Defence 2008. p8. 
38 Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2009. p1. 
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integrity, national unification, maritime security and regional stability. Hu Jintao, in the 
tradition of previous leaders, has made sure that the military is firmly under the control 
of the CCP through the Central Military Commission. Tiananmen Square 
demonstrated PLA support for the CCP is critical for its survival and hold on power. 
The CCP sees the main sources of internal instability that need to be guarded against 
as ethnic violence, unemployment, income inequality and cross border criminal 
activity. The second goal is the maintenance of territorial integrity. This goal seeks to 
make China secure from external threats. The end of the Cold War has seen border 
security and the issue of unresolved border claims become more complicated for 
China. The third goal is National unification and is directed at preventing Taiwan from 
declaring de jure or formal independence. China sees the Taiwan issue as a matter of 
sovereignty under the One China Policy. While China is trying to achieve peaceful 
unification through greater interdependence in economic activity, the use of force 
cannot be ruled out. The fourth goal is maritime security and is centered on maritime 
disputes in the East and South China Seas and the need to secure China’s Sea Lines 
of Communication in the Asia – Pacific. The last goal is regional stability in East Asia. 
The aim of this goal is to avoid war and economic disruption through internal control, 
area denial capability around China’s periphery and limited force projection 
capabilities39. The Chinese are building military capability to pursue their defence 
goals that are not fully disclosed in their Defence White Paper. 
 
The PLA is modernizing to be able to conduct active defence in a land environment. 
This is being achieved through mechanization and increases in command, control 
                                               
39  T.M. Fravel, (2008), China’s Search for Military Power. The Washington Quarterly. Vol 31 No 3. pp 2 – 3. 
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and communications systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
systems. The Chinese have analyzed US operations in the First and Second Gulf 
Wars and identified the affect of the Revolution in Military Affairs on the conduct of 
land operations using joint forces in a Network Centric Warfare (The Chinese term for 
this an informationised environment). Given China’s border disputes and its need to 
deter a lodgment in China on its East Asia border the PLA is working to try and close 
the capability gap between it and potential opponents. The key area of military 
development for East Asia is in the expansion of the PLAN and PLAAF capabilities.  
 
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) with the PLA Navy (PLAN) is the key to China’s 
capability to extend the defence of its periphery. The PLAAF has acquired third and 
fourth generation fighter aircraft and has one regiment of 23 Su-30Mk2 Flanker 
aircraft that provide maritime air support from land bases. The assessment is that the 
PLAAF is of low quality but has quantity.40 However, China is developing a stealth 
fighter, the J-20 that will be capable of evading radar.41  A greater investment will be 
required in the PLAAF if it is to match the US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy (USN). 
 
The PLAN is developing capabilities to extend its maritime active defence area from 
China’s coastal area to, initially, the first island chain (Japan, Taiwan and the 
Philippines) and eventually to what it is describing as the second island chain (Bonin, 
Mariana Islands and Guam)42. The key initial objective for area denial operations in 
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the first island chain is the control of Taiwan with the securing of the South China Sea 
and its territories as a subsequent objective43. To achieve these objectives the PLAN 
is developing its surface and sub-surface fleets.  The surface fleet is being built up 
with ships capable of launching Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (SLCM) and Surface to Air 
Missiles that would significantly threaten any maritime force. The submarine force has 
been built up since 1995. This force is a combination of nuclear powered attack 
submarines and submarines carrying SLCM. These submarines are difficult to track 
and increase the risk to US and East and South East Asian naval forces. The PLAN’s 
maritime air has a limited capability but also has an anti-ship missile capability, which 
is of concern to the US. The other complicating factor in the Taiwan Straits area is the 
growing number of Short Range Ballistic Missiles targeted at Taiwan. US 
assessments in 2009 are that there is some 2, 200 CCS-6 and CSS-7 SRBM aimed 
at Taiwan. China’s amphibious force capability is limited. China also has aspirations 
of building up an aircraft carrier capability. China has one Russian Kuznetsov Class 
aircraft carrier that is being refurbished. There are also reports that China is seeking 
to buy Su-33 carrier-borne fighter aircraft as part of this capability development.44 The 
PLAN has started to train pilots in carrier operations by building a mock aircraft carrier 
deck airfield. Carrier Task Force operations are very complicated and it will take 
China some time to develop this capability. The US Defence Intelligence Agency’s 
assessment is that China does not currently have the capability to invade and hold 
Taiwan45 
 
                                               
43 T.M. Flavel, China’s Search for Military Power, p.4. 
44 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, p.40. 
45 Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China. .p44. 
 23 
China is also developing its 2nd Artillery Force regional and strategic missile strike 
capability. China has a declared policy of no first strike and that its nuclear forces are 
a deterrent force46. However, China has increased the survivability of its 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. In 2009/2010 
the PLAN will bring into service a JIN Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
(SSBN) that will have JL-2 SLBM with a range of 7,200km that will provide an 
independent nuclear strike capability against the US.47 The DF21D medium range 
ballistic missile is being developed to destroy a moving aircraft carrier at ranges 
greater than 1500km. The DF21D can evade the Aegis anti-missile system, which 
makes it a significant threat to US Carrier Groups. Admiral Willard, Commander 
Pacific Command claims that the DF21D has reached initial operational capability.48 
The increased capability of the 2nd Artillery Force is causing uncertainty as to China’s 
intent within the US and Asia. Developments in nuclear forces mesh in with strategic 
deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons against China that complements 
China’s area denial capability build-up directed at contingencies involving Taiwan and 
the South China Sea. 
 
Given the lessons of the two Gulf Wars, China is building up its asymmetric warfare 
capabilities. These capabilities are termed the “Assassins Mace” and are centered on 
electronic warfare, electromagnetic pulse weapons and computer network attack. 
This programme extends to space operations and China’s Anti- Satellite Programme. 
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In January 2007, China successfully shot down one of its old weather satellites49. 
This indicated to the US and Asia that China’s area denial capabilities had reached 
new heights and raised more concerns about China’s ultimate security intent. The US 
has reacted to Chinese military capability developments and has outlined its position 
clearly in foreign policy and defence policy documents. 
 
China and East and South East Asian Security Uncertainty  
 
The rise of China and what it means for security in East and South East Asia is 
causing uncertainty. Will China be a status quo power, a revisionist power or will it 
seek revenge for the “100 Years Shame”? This uncertainty is causing concern in the 
Asia – Pacific as countries in the region seek to either balance or hedge against the 
alternate futures proposed by national intelligence agencies. Two writers, George 
Friedman and Martine Jacques, have proposed differing views that adequately frame 
the options for China’s rise. 
 
George Friedman in his book, “The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century”, 
argues that China is not expansionist and that it will not hold together in its current 
form. He argues that it will not hold together in its current form because of its internal 
tensions between a wealthy coast and poor agrarian interior, secessionist pressures 
from Tibet and Xingjian, and structural problems with the Chinese economy that will 
see a repeat of the weaknesses faced by the Japanese economy.50  Friedman claims 
that China is held together by money and not ideology. This claim fits with comments 
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that if the Chinese economy growth drops below 8% GDP per annum, China will face 
internal security problems. President George W. Bush asked Premier Hu Jintao what 
kept him awake at night and his answer was the need to create 25 million new jobs 
per year.51  Friedman proposes that China has two courses of action for the future. 
The first course is that the CCP impose order through centralized control and 
appealing to Chinese Nationalism. The second course is that China fragments but 
stays together under a federal type system. Of the two courses, Friedman thinks that 
the second is the most likely and that China will not pose a significant threat to the 
Asia – Pacific Region because of this primary internal focus.52  
 
Martin Jacques in his book “When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle 
Kingdom and the End of the Western World” states that China will reject the 
Westphalian state system and move back to the Middle Kingdom and the tributary 
system. This system would see the old tributary states bandwagon with China. 
Jacques argues that China and America will be the two main global powers and that 
China is a civilization state rather than a nation state. China will be a status quo state 
for the next 20 years but it will reject the western concept of modernity. Jacques 
argues that while China has not been historically an expansionist state, it’s deep 
rooted superiority complex could cause problems once it emerges as a global power 
with military capability. It is this uncertainty that is causing Asia – Pacific states to be 
unsure and weary of the rise of China.53   
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While there is a lot of uncertainty over the rise of China, three themes have emerged. 
The first is that CCP will not allow China to be split up (the anti-splitist policy) as some 
commentators have prophesized. The second is that China sees Taiwan and its off 
shore islands (this includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) as part of China and that in 
time Taiwan will be reintegrated into China as happened with Hong Kong – one 
China, two systems policy. The third theme is that China sees the South China Sea 
as part of its sovereign territory and that in time it will take control of the South China 
Sea. China’s view of itself as a sovereign state will mean that it will come into military 
conflict with the US and other East and South East Asian states. The states of SEA 
will need to decide at some point whether they are going to balance against China or 
capitulate and bandwagon with China.  The United States as the single Super Power 
in the present unipolar world, has taken the lead in trying to manage the emergence 
of China as a global power and to guarantee peace in the Asia - Pacific.  
 
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY  
 
The United States has been the guarantor of East and South East Asian security 
through a hub and spoke security system and the forward basing of US Forces in the 
region since 1945. This system was originally constructed to confront the growth of 
communism in East and South East Asia during the Cold War. The system of security 
agreements was directed mainly at the USSR, China, North Korea and Viet Nam. 
With the end of the Cold War and the break up of the USSR, the US security system 
in East and South East Asia has been more oriented toward China. The East and 
South East Asian young democracies have been inward focused as they have sort to 
develop their economies and political structures. The growth of China since 1978 has 
been of concern because of the uncertainty over China’s real intent towards the 
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region and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. The US has sort to 
guarantee security in the region and to avoid an arms race or the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the region as result of China’s rise and North Korea’s nuclear 
programme. There is, however, uncertainty in East and South East Asia over the 
long-term sustainability of the United States security commitment to the region given 
the 2008 global financial crisis and its impact on the US economy. This concern is 
further exacerbated by the financial and moral cost to the US involvement in wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The US has moved to alleviate fears of a US disengagement 
from Asia through policy statements, increased diplomacy (visits by Secretary of 
State, Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates) and a visit in 
November 2010 by President Obama. President Obama’s visit covered India, 
Indonesia, South Korea (this visit included the G20 Meeting) and Japan (this visit 
included the APEC Meeting). President Obama actively voiced his rejection of the 
“Beijing Consensus” that places economic development ahead of the development of 
personal liberty.54 China’s rise and the possible decline of the US will have an impact 
on whether SEA countries pursue security strategy of balancing, hedging or 
bandwagoning to deal with the rise of China.  
This section of the paper will examine the question what is the US foreign and 
security policy in the Asia – Pacific and its possible impact on the security strategies 
that SEA countries may pursue to deal with the rise of China?  Is the US military 
posture capable of meeting security agreements with Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and 
the Philippines and making other SEA countries feel secure enough to not 
bandwagon with China? 
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The US is uncertain about the long-term military intent of the Chinese Communist 
Party as the People’s Republic of China rises as a global political and economic 
power and a regional military power. The United States sees Chinese military 
capability to deny access to Taiwan and the South China Sea as a threat to East and 
SEA security. This denial of access would also affect the security of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, which are major US trading partners. The US seeks to maintain 
hegemony in SEA and to maintain conditions for the continued development of 
democratic government, human rights and free trade. Any disputes and conflicting 
territorial claims between Asia-Pacific countries should be dealt with peacefully 
without resort to military force. The values expounded by the US are an important 
cornerstone to its international engagement and its security policy. The US will use 
military force to defend these values. The US promotes the sovereignty of individual 
countries and their right to develop at their own pace. The need to promote free trade 
is linked into the US objective of maintaining freedom of movement on Asia’s sea 
lines of communication to allow the free movement of energy, raw materials and 
commerce. The US has pursued its foreign and security policy in SEA through 
international institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, World Trade Organisation and ASEAN and its connected fora. US 
involvement in ASEAN has allowed the US to influence regional approaches to 
foreign and defence policy. In the security area, the US has mainly worked through a 
hub and spoke system. The only use of a multi lateral alliance approach to security in 
SEA involving the US was the South East Asia Treaty Organisation formed in 1954. 
SEATO members included the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, France, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. The SEATO alliance was 
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terminated in 1977 because the members interests where too diverse.55 The present 
system rests on bilateral agreements between the US and key countries in East and 
South East Asia. While these agreements help to guarantee security in East and 
South East Asia, they have the potential to cause decision points that could lead to 
military conflict between the United States and China. US security and defence policy 
is laid out in the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defence Review that 
link into existing US bilateral security agreements. 
 
The Obama Administration published its National Security Strategy (NSS) in May 
2010. The US signalled that it will continue to pursue comprehensive engagement 
and cooperation with 21st Century centres of influence including China, India and 
Russia on the basis of mutual interests and respect. The NSS sent some clear 
messages to countries, including China, that might challenge the current international 
status quo, “to adversarial governments we offer a clear choice: abide by international 
norms, and achieve the political and economic benefits that come with greater 
integration with the international community or refuse to accept this pathway and bear 
the consequences of that decision.”56  The NSS makes it clear that the use of military 
force may at times be necessary to defend the US and its allies and that the US 
reserves the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend the US and its interests.57  
The NSS states that international order cannot be supported by international 
institutions alone but must be underpinned by bilateral, multilateral and global 
strategies that address underlying sources of insecurity. The alliances with Japan, 
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South Korea, Australia, Philippines and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia 
and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia – Pacific Region.58  The US is seeking to 
deepen and update alliances with Japan and South Korea to face evolving 21st 
Century security challenges and to ensure a sustainable foundation for the US 
presence in Japan and South Korea.59  The NSS states that the US seeks a positive, 
constructive and comprehensive relationship with China. However, the US is 
monitoring China’s military modernisation programme and will prepare accordingly to 
ensure that US interests and allies regionally and globally are not negatively affected. 
The US will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security and 
prosperity as China’s influence rises.60  Part of this strategy is for the US to continue 
to encourage a reduction in tension between China and Taiwan. The NSS covers the 
US approach to what it calls “safeguarding the global commons”. The US will act in 
concert with allies and partners to optimise the use of shared sea, air and space 
domains. This includes keeping strategic straits and vital sea-lanes open, improving 
the detection of emerging maritime threats, denying adversaries hostile use of the air 
domain and ensuring the responsible use of space.61  The NSS is sending messages 
to East and South East Asian countries that the US will continue to guarantee security 
in the region. The US is also sending a clear message to China that it will not stand 
by and watch it develop capabilities or attempts to assert itself in the Asia – Pacific. 
The Chinese must see the NSS as an open threat to its territorial aspirations in 
Taiwan and the South China Sea. 
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The Quadrennial Defence Review Report 2010 (QDR 2010) builds on the NSS 2010 
and is very pointed in its comments on China’s military developments and their 
potential for conflict. The QDR 2010 states that the rise of China, the world’s most 
populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will shape the 
international system in which the US will remain the most powerful actor. The US will 
need to work with key allies and partners to sustain peace and stability.62  The QDR 
2010 lays down six key missions for the US Defence Force: defend the US and 
support civil authorities at home; succeed in Counter Insurgency Operations, stability 
and Counter Terrorist operations; build the security capacity of partner states; deter 
and defeat aggression in anti-access environments; prevent the proliferation and 
counter Weapons of Mass Destruction and operate effectively in cyberspace. The 
mission to deter and defeat aggression in anti access environments is directed at 
Chinese military capability developments in the South China Sea and Straits of 
Taiwan. The QDR states: as part of its long term comprehensive military 
modernisation China is fielding and developing large numbers of medium range 
ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced 
weapons, increasingly capable long range air defence systems, Electronic Warfare 
and Computer Network Attack capability, advanced fighter aircraft and counter space 
systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope and 
ultimate aims of its military modernisation systems raising a number of legitimate 
questions regarding its long-term intentions.63 To counter Chinese military 
developments, the US is developing a joint Air – Sea Battle Concept to defeat 
adversaries such as China who have sophisticated anti-access and area denial 
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capabilities. The US is also to expand its long-range strike capabilities to counter 
threats to forward deployed troops and bases. Command and control and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are to be enhanced to support precision 
attack. In 2008 the Space Protection Strategy was developed to reduce vulnerability 
and rapid augmentation and reconstitution of space capabilities.64 This strategy was a 
reaction to the Chinese shooting down one of their old satellites to test their Anti 
Satellite Attack capability and other directed energy weapon programmes designed to 
kill satellites. The US justification for the development of capabilities that are directed 
at China is: without dominant US capabilities to project power, the integrity of the US 
alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing US 
security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.65  The QDR sees the 
need for the US to strengthen its relationships in North East Asia and South East 
Asia. The US will build on its bilateral relationship with Japan and South Korea and 
enhance relationships with Thailand, Philippines and Singapore and new 
relationships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam.66  The key defence 
relationships to address the uncertain rise of China are between the US and Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. These bilateral agreements provide the US with 
forward basing in East and South East Asia and allow the countries concerned to 
hedge against the potential threat posed by China. 
 
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States 
of America was originally signed in January 1960. This treaty guaranteed that the US 
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would act to protect Japan within the framework of the United Nations and US law. 
The treaty also granted the US land, air and naval forces use of facilities and areas in 
Japan to allow the US to forward base forces in Japan.67  The importance of the 
treaty between the US and Japan was reemphasised in 1996 with the signing of the 
Japan – US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century by the 
Japanese Prime Minister and US President. The agreement declared that the US 
deterrence under the Treat of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the 
guarantee for Japan’s security and US commitment to the defence of Japan.68  The 
continued importance of this agreement was underlined on 28 October 2010 when 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, reaffirmed the US would defend Japan against an 
attack on its territory as a result of an incident between the Japanese Coast Guard 
and a Chinese fishing boat off the disputed Senkaku Islands.69  The Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security ensures that the US will have military basing areas in East 
Asia for the foreseeable future and that the US continues to guarantee Japan’s 
security against threats from China or North Korea. This allows the US and Japan to 
balance against China. This incident sent a clear message to all Asia-Pacific 
countries and especially ASEAN, that it will ensure that freedom of navigation will be 
maintained and that it will not accept disputes being settled by force or intimidation. 
The US reaction also counters any Japanese need to re-militarise to meet threats 
from China. Japan maintaining the status quo, is also important for ASEAN security. 
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The Taiwan Relations Act 1979 was signed by President Jimmy Carter on 12 April 
1979 and passed by the US Congress into law. This act allowed the US to normalise 
diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. However, the act makes it 
clear that, “the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be 
determined by peaceful means”. The act goes on to state that any attempt to 
determine the future of Taiwan by non peaceful means would be of grave concern to 
the US and that the US would maintain the capacity to protect Taiwan. The act also 
allows for the provision of arms to Taiwan for defensive purposes.70  The Taiwan 
Relations Act has not been repealed and has formed the basis of US relations with 
Taiwan that have irritated China who see Taiwan as a domestic sovereignty issue. In 
1996 President Clinton reacted to threats to Taiwan by deploying two Carrier Task 
Forces into the Taiwan Straits.71  President Obama has also fallen fowl of the 
Chinese by agreeing to $US6.4 billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan to counter 
increases in Chinese forces opposite Taiwan.72  Consequently, China cut off all 
higher-level military exchanges between China and the US in January 2010. In 
supporting Taiwan, the US and Taiwan are balancing against China and ensuring 
access to an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the form of Taiwan Island. 
 
The US – Republic of Korea Mutual Defence Treaty 1953 guarantees that the US will 
protect South Korea from external aggression. This treaty allows the US to maintain 
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land, air and maritime forces in South Korea under the Combined Forces Command 
that commands US, South Korean and United Nations forces located in South Korea. 
The command relationship between South Korean and US Forces Korea is under 
going change to allow greater South Korean sovereignty and by 2012 the South 
Korean military will take wartime operational control of forces.73  This treaty has been 
primarily directed at North Korea but also provides the US with forward basing for 
China contingencies 
The US and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1990 that 
allowed access to Singapore military facilities for US Forces. This MOU has been 
amended several times since 1990 to expand US access to Singapore military 
facilities at Paya Leba Airbase, Sembawang Ship Yard and Changi Naval Base. In 
1992, the US Naval Logistics Unit was established in Singapore to support US Navy 
deployments in the region. In 2005, the US and Singapore signed a Strategic 
Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security. This 
agreement reinforces the 1990 MOU and takes into account new security threats 
such as terrorism, WMD proliferation and piracy. The US is ensuring that it has 
forward basing areas for its Forces in SEA should the need arise. 
 
The US military presence in East and South East Asia is considerable. The QDR 
2010 indicates that even in spite of the 2008 Financial Crisis and its impact on the US 
economy the conventional forces in Asia will not be reduced. The US Pacific 
Command (PACOM) is the oldest and largest of the 10 US Unified Combat 
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Commands. PACOM’s mission is to protect and defend the US, its territories, Allies 
and interests; alongside Allies and partners, promotes regional security and deters 
aggression; and if deterrence fails, is prepared to respond to the full spectrum of 
military contingencies to restore Asia – Pacific stability and security.74  USPACOM 
has approximately 250, 000 personnel or about 20% of the total US military strength. 
The US Pacific Fleet includes five aircraft carrier strike groups and the US Marine 
Corps Pacific possesses 66% of the USMC combat strength. The US Navy and 
USMC PACOM comprise more than 180 ships and 1,400 aircraft. The US Air Forces 
Pacific has about 350 aircraft.75 To cover defence responsibilities in East and South 
East Asia the US has forward deployed forces in Japan, South Korea and Guam. The 
US Forces Japan comprises the 7th Fleet, which has a Carrier Task Force (CTF-70) 
at Yokosuka, 5th Air Force and 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. The 7th Fleet Logistics 
Group is based in Singapore. US Forces Korea comprises the 8th Army and 7th Air 
Force. The 7th Fleet has responsibility for commanding all allied naval forces in East 
and South East Asia in the event of defence of the Korean Peninsula. The forward 
deployed forces would be reinforced by PACOM and other combatant commands in 
the event of war in East or South East Asia.  
The US hub and spoke security system and forward deployed PACOM Forces in East 
and South East Asia has assisted the US to maintain its hegemony in the Asia – 
Pacific Region. This system has allowed the US to balance against China and for 
East Asian and South East Asian countries to hedge their security by sitting under the 
US security umbrella. The Obama Administration has signalled through the NSS, 
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QDR 2010 and high-level diplomacy by President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton 
and Secretary of Defence Gates, that the US is fully committed to the Asia-Pacific 
region and its future. The US has no doubt as to the importance of its military role in 
the Asia-Pacific to ensure freedom of navigation and security in the face of a rising 
China. To enhance its ability to manage the emergence of China as a regional power 
the US is developing its political, economic and military relationship with Vietnam. 
 
VIET NAM AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY  
 
 
 
The Viet Nam case study seeks to identify whether Viet Nam is balancing or hedging 
against China or bandwagoning with China to ensure its security. This section will 
argue that Viet Nam is passive balancing and hedging against the uncertain rise of 
China as a major world power. Viet Nam is not bandwagoning with China in a 
political, economic or military way to avoid China’s revisionist objectives in the South 
East Asian region. Viet Nam has a long history of conflict and competition with China. 
While Viet Nam has fought a war against the United States, since 1995 Viet Nam’s 
relations with the United States have improved and this is being used to passive 
balance against the Chinese and hedge for the future. Chinese aggressiveness over 
South China Sea (or East Sea as it is referred to by Viet Nam) territorial disputes will 
see the Chinese push the Viet Names further into the United States security system 
to counter China. 
Viet Nam’s Foreign and Defence Policy 
 
Viet Nam is a single party state under the control of the Viet Namese Communist 
Party (VCP). There are no indications that Viet Nam has any desire to be a pluralist 
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liberal democratic state in the foreseeable future.76  The VCP confirmed Viet Nam’s 
present foreign policy at the VCP 10th National Congress in 2006. Viet Nam’s foreign 
policy objective is to maintain its independence and self-reliance through peaceful 
cooperation and development. The foreign policy tasks are laid down as: solid 
preservation of a peaceful environment, creation of favourable international conditions 
for the accelerated socio-economic development of national industrialisation and 
modernisation and the construction and defence of the homeland.77  This foreign 
policy is in line with most ASEAN states who, as young independent post colonial 
states seek to protect their sovereignty from external interference and whose priority 
is the development of their economy, political institutions and society. To allow these 
objectives to be achieved, peace and the status quo in international relations are 
critical. Any political, economic or military activity that threatens the status quo must 
be countered. To achieve this Viet Nam is relying on its membership of ASEAN and 
all its associated forums and international relationship building through diplomacy. In 
total, Viet Nam is a member of 63 international organisations, including the UN, WTO, 
IMF and World Bank. It maintains relations with 650 non-government organisations 
and sees itself as part of the non-aligned world.78 
Diplomacy is the first line of defence for Viet Nam. The National Defence White Paper 
2009 states:” Viet Nam always regards the maintenance of peaceful and stable 
environment for socio-economic development, industrialisation and modernisation, 
building the socialism-orientated market economy as the top national interest and the 
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consistent goal of its national defence policy.79  The White Paper further states, 
“Vietnam’s consistent policy is to solve both historical and newly emerging disputes 
over territorial sovereignty in land and at sea through peaceful means on the basis of 
international laws”. 80 However, Viet Nam still reserves the right to defend its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.81  Viet Nam sees the need to build a strong 
economy, develop a “just-enough national defence capability and develop its 
international relations to ensure its security. Viet Nam will build its military capability 
as it can afford it and put greater reliance on defence cooperation to maintain peace 
and stability in the region and wider world.82  On the bilateral level Viet Nam promotes 
defence cooperation with all countries and promotes the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community and forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and 
ARF. Vietnam is using the Realist concept of hedging to ensure its security. Viet 
Nam’s security has been threatened by China for over 2000 years and China’s rise 
and uncertainty over whether it will be a status quo or revisionist power still posses a 
threat to Viet Nam. 
China and Viet Nam Relations 
In 111BC, China’s Han Dynasty conquered Viet Nam’s Red River Delta and ruled 
over the area for 1000 years. In 939 AD, Viet Nam achieved independence under a 
native dynasty and lived in relative peace with China until 1979. During most of Viet 
Nam’s long history it was a tributary state of China. Between 1954 and 1979 Viet 
Nam tried to balance relations between China and the USSR. However, there were 
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tensions with China during the Cultural Revolution 1966 - 76 when China was critical 
of Viet Nam’s ties with the Soviet Union. This was further exacerbated by Viet Nam 
joining the COMECON in the 1880s. In 1979, Viet Nam invaded Cambodia whose 
Khmer Rouge were supported by China. This resulted in China invading northern Viet 
Nam and a bloody border war ensued in which China was defeated. In 1991, Viet 
Nam withdrew from Cambodia and Viet Nam and China settled their border dispute in 
with a Land Border Agreement in December 1999. After the signing of the Paris 
Agreement in 1991, Viet Nam was admitted into ASEAN and re-established 
diplomatic ties with China.83  Viet Nam’s major security concern is now competing 
claims with China over the Spratly Islands (Truong Sa) and Parecel (Hoang Sa) 
Islands. There have been a number of confrontations between Viet Namese and 
Chinese forces over the disputed ownership of areas of the Spratly and Parecel 
Islands. In 1988 Vietnamese and Chinese naval forces clashed in the Spratly Islands 
resulting in 70 Viet Namese sailors being killed.84  In 2007 – 8, China pressured 
foreign oil companies (2008 US ExxonMobil) to abandon their oil and gas exploration 
contracts with Viet Nam. This sparked anti Chinese demonstrations by Viet Namese 
students.85 During 2009 China has become more aggressive in its claims to the whole 
South China Sea, which it sees as Chinese sovereign territory. Viet Nam has tried to 
enhance its claims by placing new administrative divisions on some Spratly Islands, 
developing tourist routes and military infrastructure.86  China has again singled out 
Viet Nam for aggressive action that Viet Nam sees as a direct threat to its 
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sovereignty. Viet Nam does not have the military strength to successfully oppose 
China’s increasing maritime and air military capability. On 11 September 2009, China 
seized nine islands near the Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) archipelago claiming that 
Viet Namese fishermen had violated Chinese territory. The Viet Namese Government 
demanded the release of the fishermen. In October 2010 the Chinese State Bureau of 
Surveying and Mapping released a South China Sea map that had a dotted line that 
took in the Paracel and Spratly Islands as Chinese territory. The Viet Namese 
complained that this map infringed its sovereignty and national jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf and 200 nautical miles EEZ. The Chinese claim violated the UN 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and ASEAN Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).87 While China and Viet Nam 
have tense relations over the East Sea both countries have taken steps to develop 
their relationship with the intent of maintaining peace and in China’s case trying to 
keep Viet Nam from getting too close to the US. In 2008, Viet Nam and China signed 
the Strategic Cooperation Partnership Agreement. This agreement seeks to increase 
cooperation between both countries and maintain good relations through the “16 word 
motto”, through which both sides pledged to ties of neighbourliness, comprehensive 
cooperation, long lasting stability and looking towards the future and the four good 
spirits which imply good relations as neighbours, friends, comrades and partners.88  
In August 2010, Viet Nam and China held their fourth strategic defence talks under 
the cooperation agreement. During this meeting Viet Namese Deputy Defence 
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Minister, Nguyen Chi Vinh, stated that Viet Nam would follow the “three nos”: not to 
enter into  military alliances, not to allow any country to set up military bases on 
Vietnamese territory and not rely on any country for combating others.89  The 
cooperation agreement with China reflects Viet Namese desire to maintain peace in 
the region but also discloses a real fear of China and what it might do to achieve its 
national interests. Viet Nam is reacting to these threats to its sovereignty by following 
a policy of hedging and cautiously developing its military relationship with the US. 
United States and Viet Nam Relations 
President Clinton’s Administration normalised relations with Viet Nam in 1995. The 
United States has become Viet Namese largest trading partner over the last nine 
years. The US Permanent Normal Trade Relations Agreement 2008 set the 
conditions for closer trade relations. In 2001, Viet Nam’s trade with the US was worth 
$US 2 billion and this had increased to $US 16 billion by 2009. The US and Viet Nam 
now engage over a wide range of activities in the political, economic and military 
spheres. The US and Viet Nam now have annual bi-lateral defence discussions. 
These discussions have focused on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster recovery, search and rescue, maritime and border security, law enforcement 
and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In June 2008 the 
USNS Mercy visited Nha Trang and treated 11 000 patients. In April 2009 senior Viet 
Namese Navy and Air Force officers visited the USS John C. Stennis aircraft carrier 
off Viet Nam.90   The US and Vietnam held their first Defence Policy Dialogue in 
Hanoi on 17 August 2010. The dialogue was between Deputy Minister of Defence, 
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Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh and US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, 
Robert Scher. The talks focused on overcoming war consequences, seeking US 
Missing-in-Action personnel, exchange of military students to study English and 
humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Deputy Minister Vinh indicated that not 
much time was spent on the East Sea issue but that security issues involving the East 
Sea needed to be resolved in accordance with international law.91  The US Viet Nam 
security relationship is in its early stages and will take time to develop given the 
history between the two countries. In October 2010, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
announced that the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay would be open for foreign navies 
for repairs and reprovisioning including submarines and aircraft carriers. This has left 
the way open for US Navy vessels to use Cam Ranh Bay.92  Viet Nam is hedging by 
remaining engaged in the ASEAN regional security process but developing a closer 
bilateral relationship with the US short of a formal defence agreement or MOU. In this 
way, Viet Nam has given notice to China that it will oppose its actions in the South 
China Sea without directly threatening through a formal arrangement with the US. 
This process conforms to the US hub and spoke security system in Asia – Pacific and 
sends the message to China that if it challenges the status quo and becomes 
revisionist that it will be opposed. Viet Namese closer relations with the US are part of 
its hedging strategy led by diplomacy to counter Chinese assertiveness. In line with 
Viet Nam’s foreign and defence policy the Viet Namese Armed Forces are being 
modernised. 
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Viet Nam People’s Army 
The doctrine of the Viet Namese People’s Army (VPA) is still based on people’s war 
and people’s national defence. This doctrine combines the old Maoist ideas of 
guerrilla warfare and conventional main force strategic and tactical operations and the 
VPA force structure reflects this approach.93  However, the Viet Nam National 
Defence 2009 recognises that the security environment has become more 
complicated for Viet Nam. The territorial disputes with China over land and sea 
borders have become more complex and in particular those relating to sovereignty 
and national interest in what Viet Nam calls the East Sea (South China Sea). Viet 
Nam has commenced the process of modernising the Viet Nam Peoples Army, which 
includes the Navy, Air Force and Air Defence. This modernisation has been outlined 
in the Viet Nam Defence White Paper: Viet Nam National Defence 2009.  Viet Nam 
will not have the capability to counter China’s military power in the near future but it is 
going to develop the capability to resist Chinese aggression and provoke an 
international response, probably led by the United States. 
The PLA is organised into seven military regions. Each region has a combined arms 
division and independent regiment plus militia and Self Defence Force elements. The 
Viet Namese Defence White Paper claims that these forces are modern, light and 
compact with high shock and firepower capabilities. However, a review of the PLA’s 
weapons and equipment indicates a force that is technologically behind with old 
1960s and 1970s Russian equipment. Vietnam has entered into agreements with 
Israeli Military Industries (IMI) to upgrade its aging Russian T55 Main Battle Tanks 
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and for Ukraine to help upgrade its armoured forces and artillery.94  In an attempt to 
refocus, the VPA has been directed by the Central Committee of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party to relinquish its business interests and concentrate on being a 
professional military by 2012.95  In 1999 the VPA passed a law to raise the standards 
of the VPA Officer Corps and to better educate them in changes in military doctrine 
and concepts as part of a plan to update Vietnamese military doctrine.96 However, it 
will take some time and significant expenditure and social change for the VPA to 
become a 21st Century Army. 
The mission of the Air Force  is to protect Viet Nam’s key facilities and people and to 
safeguard the Homeland’s seas and islands.97  The mainstay of the Air Force is 140 
Russian MIG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft.98 In 2000, Viet Nam signed a Defence 
Cooperation Agreement to upgrade the MIG-21 fleet. To enhance the capability of the 
Viet Namese Air Force has acquired four Su-30MK2 fighter aircraft, seven Su-27SK 
and 53 Su22M4 Ground Attack Aircraft. Exactly how many of the more advanced 
aircraft Viet Nam has in service is not know. Nor this their combat capability. Carlyle 
Thayer has indicated that Viet Nam has approached the Ukraine to upgrade the Su22 
with anti-ship missiles.99  The Viet Namese Air Defence system has also been 
upgraded with the acquisition of two batteries of S-300 PMU1 surface to air 
missiles.100  The S-300 PMU1 will reinforce the older Russian air defence systems 
that the Viet Namese has in service. The modern Russian designed combat aircraft 
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will give Viet Nam some capability to counter Chinese air and sea incursions into 
disputed areas in its East Sea (South China Sea). 
The mission of the Navy is to manage and control the waters and islands of the East 
Sea under Viet Namese sovereignty and to counter any acts of violation of maritime 
sovereignty.101  Viet Nam has given notice in the Defence White Paper that it will 
equip the Navy with modern and enhanced combat power to be capable of protecting 
Viet Nam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and interests at sea102. The 
PLAN has four Tarantul 2 corvettes from Russia armed with SS-N-2D Styx anti ship 
missiles, five Frigates and 38 patrol and coastal combatant craft.103  Viet Nam is also 
seeking to increase its anti submarine warfare capability through the acquisition of six 
Prokeet 636 Kilo Class submarines. This force is to counter the Chinese submarine 
elements that are based at Hainan Island and it is projected that the project will cost 
$US1 billion.104  In 2002, Viet Nam requested that India provide submarine training to 
the Navy to assist with developing a submarine capability off its two North Korean 
Yugo Class midget submarines. In 2008, Viet Nam acquired three Spanish EADS 
CASA C212 Series 400 maritime control aircraft to enhance its maritime capability. 
While Viet Nam seeks to avoid direct confrontation with China in the East Sea it is 
serving notice that it will defend its sovereignty.  
 
The enhancements of the Air Force and Navy indicate that Viet Nam’s defence policy 
is one of self-help and it is also hedging to counter current and future threats from 
China. However, it is clear that Viet Nam does not posses the defence capability to 
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defend itself against China unaided and will rely on regional and international 
diplomatic and possibly US military intervention to guarantee its security. In contrast 
Malaysia does not have the historical relationship that Viet Nam has with the US and 
the limitations that history imposes. However, Malaysia has a strong Muslim factor to 
consider that also causes it to be cautious.  
 
MALAYSIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY  
 
 
Malaysia is reacting to the uncertain rise of China by hedging to ensure it maintains 
its security. Malaysia’s foreign policy’s cornerstone is ASEAN followed by support for 
the role of the United Nations. Malaysia’s defence policy is based on self-reliance but 
is pragmatic enough to realize that Malaysia will not be able to deal with all possible 
future threats on its own. Malaysia’s Defence Force is large and well resourced by 
Asian standards but its development is being limited by the present global economic 
downturn. Malaysia’s relationship with China is mainly economic and there is still 
distrust of what China’s rise, as a military power will mean for Asia – Pacific security. 
Even though Malaysia sees China as important to its future it is not bandwagoning 
with China. To counter the uncertainty caused by China’s rise, Malaysia maintains a 
good economic and military relationship with the United States. To avoid antagonizing 
China and the Muslim world Malaysia is not balancing with the United States. 
 
Malaysian Foreign and Defence Policy 
 
Malaysia’s foreign policy has developed since independence from Great Britain as a 
reaction to regional instability after independence, superpower rivalry during the Cold 
War and changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the rise of China and Asia 
– Pacific as the world’s economic powerhouse. The pillars of Malaysia’s foreign policy 
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are: multi - literalism; regionalism, Islamic solidarity; and non-alignment.105 Diplomacy 
is the most important means for Malaysia to promote peace, security and progress.106  
Multi-lateralism is based on Malaysia’s support for the United Nations, British 
Commonwealth and the East Asia Summit and the multi national organisations that 
have been built off the core members of ASEAN that bring in major Asia – Pacific 
stakeholders and link into Europe and Latin America107. The ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), made up of 23 Asia – Pacific nations, is focused on dealing with security 
issues that affect the region. ARF was meant to develop into a regional security 
organization with the power to coordinate responses to threats to security in Asia. 
ARF has not developed past Track One and some have accused it of being an 
ineffectual talk shop. Malaysia however, sees the ARF as useful as an organization to 
bring issues into the open and to put pressure on member countries to conform to the 
ASEAN concept of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). This 
Liberal Institutionalist/Constructivist approach is seen as a way of making countries 
more interdependent to assist with maintaining global security. This strategy helps 
Malaysia to diplomatically hedge against threats from the major powers. The 
regionalism pillar is the cornerstone of Malaysia’s approach to foreign relations. 
Malaysia was a founding member of ASEAN in 1967 and is one of its most influential 
members. Malaysia has promoted the “ASEAN Way” that calls for consensus 
decision-making and promotes the concept of ZOPFAN. Islamic solidarity is 
maintained through membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). 
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Malaysia was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was 
formed as a reaction to superpower rivalry and a desire for newly independent 
countries to distance themselves from the US and the USSR.  Since the end of the 
Cold War the NAM or G77 has become an organization that represents the economic 
interests of the G77 to the G8 and now G20. 
 
In 1981, Mahathir launched the “Look East Policy” as part of his foreign policy 
reorientation from the UK to East Asia.108  This also signalled a change to the 
structure of the Malaysian economy from primary products to a manufacturing 
orientation. Mahathir felt that Malaysia would gain more from following Japan, South 
Korea’s and Taiwan’s economic model than the UK’s. Over time the Look East Policy 
has also meant that Malaysia has become more economically interdependent on 
China. Given its economic orientation and non-aligned stance, Malaysia would gain 
no advantage by bandwagoning or balancing with China by entering into a formal 
alliance with it or any of the East Asian countries.109   Malaysia was one of the key 
countries that supported the formation of the East Asia Summit to help deal with the 
growth of China and Japan as a hedging strategy. This hedging strategy seeks to use 
international institutions to counter the risk caused by the rise of China and Japan’s 
and the US’s reaction to it.110   
Malaysia’s defence policy is based on three basic fundamentals. These fundamentals 
are: strategic interests, principles of defence and the concept of Total Defence. The 
objective of the defence policy is to maintain a peaceful and stable regional and 
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international environment to support Malaysia’s top priority and continued economic 
development.111 Strategic interests have three tiers. : The immediate area, which is 
the land, national waters, EEZ, Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Singapore and the 
air, sea gap between the Malay Peninsular and Sabah and Sarawak. The regional 
area is SEA, Andaman Islands and South China Sea. The global area is worldwide 
trade links to ensure global peace so that Malaysia’s global trade is not disrupted.112  
 
Malaysia’s Defence Policy is based on the principles of self – reliance, regional 
cooperation and foreign assistance. The concept of self-reliance calls for Malaysia to 
be able to deal independently with internal security problems and the immediate 
security area. The concept of self-reliance is the cornerstone of defence policy. 
Regional cooperation is based on the premise that a threat to an ASEAN country is a 
threat to Malaysia and bilateral defence relationships. The ARF is seen by Malaysia 
as a critical part of regional cooperation that has yet to be proven effective in a crisis. 
ASEAN has actively avoided creating a security alliance like NATO because it would 
be seen as provocative to China. The last principle is external assistance. Malaysia is 
pragmatic enough to acknowledge that it cannot defend itself against all security risks 
and threats. In peacetime Malaysia needs moral and physical support, military 
training to keep up with changes in military doctrine and technology and the supply of 
advanced military equipment such as fighter aircraft and submarines. The only formal 
military defence arrangement that Malaysia has is the Five Power Defence 
Agreement (FPDA). The United Nation’s Charter forms the basis of a defensive 
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posture that still gives Malaysia the right to defend itself from external aggression.113  
To ensure that Malaysia is self-reliant, it supports the Realist concept of self-help by 
supporting the idea of deterrence. Deterrence is achieved by Malaysia maintaining a 
credible Defence Force with an effective war fighting capability to deter aggression. 
Close defence ties between Malaysia and the Commonwealth countries in the FPDA 
also add deterrence.   
The Malaysian Chief of the Navy, Admiral Abdul Aziz Jaafar, stated that the greatest 
maritime security threat to Malaysia is the conflicting claims by China and Malaysia 
over the Spratly Islands. Malaysia claims 12 features and occupies five islands. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the threat to Malaysia from China in the South China Sea was 
used to justify increased defence expenditure and the acquisition of FA18D fighter 
aircraft from the US and frigates and patrol boats.114  In March 2009, Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi visited the Swallow Reef, which caused protest from China who saw 
the visit as a threat to their sovereignty claim over the whole South China Sea.115 In 
2010, China became more assertive over its South China Sea claims and Prime 
Minister Najib Razak commented that China had become “more assertive than 
before”.116  Such action has caused Malaysia concern over China’s true intent in the 
Spratly Islands. Military ties with the US act as a hedge against security threats such 
as the uncertain rise of China assist Malaysian security as well. 
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United States and Malaysia Relations 
The US/Malaysia relationship has a diplomatic, economic and military dimension. The 
US views Malaysia as an important country that is modern, wealthy and a moderate 
progressive Muslim state that has a voice in the OIC. The US is Malaysia’s largest 
trading partner with an annual two-way trade of $US44 billion. Malaysia is the US’s 
16th largest trading partner.117 Malaysia has seen the US presence in the Asia – 
Pacific as a positive influence on the maintenance of security in the region. Malaysia 
has not signed a formal defence treaty with the US in line with its foreign and defence 
policy and has not always supported the US’s foreign policy. However, Malaysia has 
allowed the US access to Malaysian military facilities and has regular military 
exercises with the US. Such a close security relationship does not exist between 
Malaysia and China. Malaysia is using the US as part of its strategy to hedge against 
the uncertain rise of China.  
The present US/Malaysia relationship dates back to 1963 and US support for 
Malaysia against the Indonesian confrontation policy against Malaysia. Under Tun 
Hussein Onn (Prime Minister 1975 – 81) Malaysia accepted Foreign Military Sales 
and Military Education Training from the US in reaction to the communist domination 
of Indo China.118  After the US was forced to leave its bases in the Philippines at 
Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, Malaysia allowed US surveillance flights to use 
Malaysian air bases and US Navy ships to use Malaysian ports to repair and maintain 
vessels. In 1995, Malaysia began an annual bilateral military exercise with the US 
titled Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training. In 2004, the annual exercise was 
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held in the South China Sea to practice combined operations and interoperability.119  
This activity is in line with Malaysia’s defence policy of external assistance but sends 
a clear message to China that it has a close relationship with the US and that US and 
Malaysian forces are capable of operating together. The 9/11 Al Qaeda attack on the 
Twin Towers in New York led to a further change in the US/Malaysia diplomatic and 
military relationship. Malaysia has assisted the US with its Global War on Terror 
through intelligence exchanges and establishing the SEA Regional Centre for 
Counter Terrorism in Kuala Lumpa in 2003.120  Malaysia has also signed a Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty with the US to cooperate on the prosecution of terrorist 
suspects.121 The US wanted to assist Malaysia with maritime patrols in the Malacca 
Straits but Malaysia refused. While Malaysia sees US presence in the region as 
contributing to security it does not want US forces operating in its immediate area. 
While Malaysia is using the US to hedge against China it is not balancing with the US.  
China Malaysia Relations 
Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak Hussein established diplomatic relations 
with China in 1974. While Malaysia had philosophical differences with China a 
relationship was still forged as a result of Malaysia’s non-aligned stance.122 
Malaysia’s relationship with China, has been based on economics and diplomacy. 
Malaysia does not have a military relationship with China but seeks to engage China 
through the ARF to meet security objectives. Mahathir Mohamad’s, Look East Policy 
acknowledged that China has an important economic part to play in the prosperity of 
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Asia and made frequent trips to China. Mahathir accepted the “One China Policy” and 
stated publically that he did not see China as a threat.123  In June 2009, Prime 
Minister Najib visited China and signed 16 different Memorandums of Understanding. 
The 2008 Global Economic Crisis has hit the Malaysian economy hard and Malaysia 
sees China as one of the few countries that can help the world out of the present 
down turn. Najib’s visit was aimed at getting agreement on Malaysian investment in 
China and Chinese investment in Malaysia. An example of Chinese investment is the 
$US10 billion Gemas to Johor Bahru double track railway.124  Malaysia’s relationship 
with China reflects its government’s first priority, which is the continued growth of the 
Malaysian economy to ensure its security. The reality is that Malaysia is still uncertain 
about the rise of China as an economic and military power in the region. Malaysia’s 
conflicting claims in the Spratly Islands and China’s reaction to Malaysia’s attempt to 
assert its claims have provided evidence that in the longer term China will not be a 
status quo but a revisionist power.125  This was evidenced by the Chinese reaction to 
the joint Malaysia/Viet Nam petition to dispute China’s territorial claims in the South 
China Sea. The petition prompted a strong response from China who had the petition 
to the UN overturned.126  China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s outburst at the ARF 
meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 when he stated that, “China is a big country and other 
countries are small countries and that is just a fact” giving ASEAN countries notice 
that China will exert its will over its claim to the whole South China Sea.127  Malaysia 
favours conflict avoidance by engaging China in fora such as ARF and the East Asia 
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Summit (EAS). The South China Sea issues remain unresolved and a source of 
potential conflict.128 Malaysia is not bandwagoning or balancing with China. 
Malaysia’s intent with its China relationship is to have a sound economic interaction 
with China to ensure the continued development of Malaysia in all respects. Malaysia 
downplays publically any threat from China and, therefore, sees no need to form a 
security alliance with China. Malaysia is happy to keep hedging against the uncertain 
rise of China by using regional fora to discuss China/ASEAN security issues even 
though no tangible resolution is achieved. 
Malaysian Defence Force Capability 
 
In line with the Defence Policy principle of self – reliance and deterrence, Malaysia 
has sort to maintain a credible defence force that is capable of dealing with security 
threats to its immediate area. The 2009 defence budget was $US3.6 billion or 2% of 
GDP.129  Malaysia seeks to maintain its knowledge of modern war fighting concepts 
and doctrine through its on going engagement with the US130 and through the FPDA. 
The Fourth Dimension Malaysian Armed Forces Plan (4-D MAF) is indicative of 
Malaysia’s desire to retain a competent defence capability.  
 
The Malaysian Land Forces has 80,000 Regular personnel supported by 60,000 
reservists. The Army is organized into four Divisional Headquarters Regional 
Commands. The regional divisions are all-arms divisions, which have modern 
equipment. The armoured elements have Polish PT-91 Main Battle Tanks and the 
older British Scorpion light armoured vehicles. The infantry and armoured elements 
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are supported by modern medium and light artillery. There is an issue at the moment 
concerning the level of operational readiness of the PT-91 Armoured Regiments due 
to the current economic downturn.131  The Army maintains a Rapid Deployment Force 
of one parachute brigade, an artillery battalion and light tank squadron.132  The Army 
continues to develop its capability under the 4-D MAF and is acquiring new ACV-300 
Adnan Armoured Combat Vehicles and has entered into an agreement with Turkey to 
develop the FNSS AV8 PARS Armoured Fighting Vehicle with a target of over 200 
vehicles.133  The on-going investment in the Malaysian Army is in line with Malaysia’s 
defence policy of being self-reliant and capable of dealing with contingencies in its 
immediate zone. 
The Malaysian Navy has a fleet made up of frigates, corvettes, Off Shore Patrol Craft 
and patrol craft armed with missiles and guns. The addition of two French built 
SCORPENE type submarines to the fleet is a significant force multiplier. The 
SCORPENE type submarine is armed with Black Shark heavy weight torpedoes and 
Exocet SM39 anti-surface ship missiles. The submarines are to be based in Kota 
Kinabalu, Saba that gives the submarines good access to the South China Sea.134  
The Malaysian Navy exercises with the US Navy and FPDA Navies to ensure that it 
maintains operational capability and is able to defend the immediate area and operate 
as part of a combined naval task group for external support contingencies. 
 
The Malaysian Air Force has 15,000 Regular personnel and 3,000 Reservists. The Air 
Force is divided into an Operations Command, four Air Divisions, an Education and 
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Training Command and Integrated Air Defence Systems Headquarters. The combat 
elements of the Malaysian Air Force are two fighter squadrons equipped with MIG29N 
and F-5 aircraft. The MIG 29N aircraft, were meant to be decommissioned and 
replaced with new fighter aircraft but this has been delayed due to the economic 
downturn. The three-fighter/ground attack squadrons are equipped with F/A 18D, 
Hawk 208 and Su30MKM aircraft. This mix of aircraft makes the Malaysian Air Force 
one of the largest and most well equipped in Asia.135 The continued development of 
the MAF and the 4-D MAF Plan and a lack of a formal defence alliance but the 
employment of defence agreements with the US indicate that Malaysia continues to 
hedge against the uncertain rise of China to ensure its security. 
 
    
INDONESIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY  
 
Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world. It has a population of 220 million 
people living on 19,000 islands strung across the equator over an area that is as wide 
as Europe or the United States. It has over 200 major language and cultural groups 
and is the largest Muslim country in the world.136  Indonesia was a Dutch colony and 
won its full independence after an armed struggle in 1949. The complexity of 
Indonesia as an independent country and its highly developed nationalism makes 
Indonesia unique. This section of the paper will examine Indonesia’s foreign and 
defence policy, its relationship with the US and China and the state of its Defence 
Force – the TNI, to see whether Indonesia is hedging, balancing or bandwagoning to 
ensure its security.  
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Indonesian Foreign and Defence Policy 
Since achieving independence in 1945 Indonesia has pursued a free and active 
foreign policy and has sort to avoid being involved in major power rivalry.137  In 1955, 
Indonesia hosted the Asia – Africa Conference in Bandung, which established the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM sort to allow countries to establish a 
separate identity from those countries aligned with the US (the 1st World) and those 
aligned with the Communist States led by the USSR (the 2nd World). President 
Sukarno saw the NAM as standing for the end of colonialism and wars being fought to 
retain colonies such as the Indo – China War.138  This independent Nationalist 
approach to foreign policy has remained a feature of Indonesian foreign policy to this 
day. In 1967 Indonesia was one of the founding members of ASEAN and ASEAN has 
become the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia supports the 2007 
ASEAN Charter that calls for the formation of a SEA Community for greater 
integration of political, security, economic, social and cultural affairs.139  The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs direction and strategy is for Indonesia to take on a more significant 
role and leadership in ASEAN and the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 
2015 and ratification of the ASEAN Charter. Indonesia is looking to take a more 
significant role in preserving its own national security and creating world peace. Its 
international objective will be achieved by encouraging United Nations reform of the 
UN Security Council and an active foreign policy to address world peace and security 
and the Middle East peace process. It seeks to improve border diplomacy to settle 
disputes with Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Viet Nam, Palau and East Timor. It 
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does not mention its dispute with China over the Natuna Islands. Indonesia seeks 
active regional cooperation in the Asia – Pacific and with Africa, America and Europe 
through multi-national fora.140  Indonesia seeks to achieve regional security through 
ASEAN and international security through the UN and ASEAN interaction with other 
regional bodies such as the European Union. Indonesia sees diplomacy as its main 
tool for maintaining security and will not agree to foreign military bases in Indonesia 
nor will it enter into alliances. The Indonesian Minister of Defence, Purnomo 
Yusgiantora at the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit stated that Indonesia believes that 
the Asian Regional Forum will be the main feature of the Asia – Pacific region. He 
claimed that behind the façade of calm in Asia sit non - traditional threats, border 
disputes, overlapping security claims, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, piracy, crime 
and natural disasters. To counter these threats Yusgiantora stated ARF needs to 
build a political and security community based on the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC). The creation of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus (ADDM+) 
supports the ARF to ensure that security issues are discussed and resolved. This 
system is further supported by Indonesia’s support for ZOPFAN and SEA Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ).  This indicates that Indonesia is taking a Liberal 
Institutionalist approach to foreign policy rather than a Realist view using balancing 
with other ASEAN countries or bandwagoning with one of the major powers.  
Since independence Indonesia’s Defence Policy has primarily focused on internal 
threats to the political stability and cohesion of the country. Nation building under the 
dual control of the government and the military has been Indonesia’s first priority.  
This was reflected in the Dwifungsi ABRI (the dual socio/political function of the 
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military) that existed from 1945 to 1998.141  The main objective of Indonesia’s 
Defence Policy is to protect and uphold state sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity 
of the unitary Republic of Indonesia and ensure the safety of Indonesian people from 
all forms of threats and disturbances (Act No 3/2002 State Defence).142 The Defence 
White Paper 2008 lays down five main strategic goals for defence: deter all forms of 
threats to Indonesia and its people, defeat military aggression by foreign countries, to 
overcome military threats that might have adverse impacts on Indonesian 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the people; and contribute to 
international peace and regional stability.143  The concept of “total peoples war” still 
exists to counter an invasion of any part of Indonesia and harks back to Indonesia’s 
fight for independence from the Dutch and a lack of resources for national defence. 
Indonesia’s Defence Policy emphasise the importance of diplomacy as the first line of 
defence through regional and international cooperation. The Defence White Paper 
2008 emphasises the need for Indonesia to improve its defence posture to uphold the 
Unitary Republic of Indonesia and that its main threats are still from terrorism and 
separatism.144  However, Indonesia realizes that there is a need to enhance its 
defence force capabilities to counter maritime security threats. Other countries in 
South East Asia and the wider Asia – Pacific have updated their navies and air 
forces. Indonesia aspires to do the same to counter breaches of territorial 
sovereignty, unresolved territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, protect its 
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EEZ and resources.145  To address gaps in military capability Indonesia has 
developed a procurement plan that will see the TNI stay at the same size but its 
capabilities will be updated with new weapons, vehicles, ships and aircraft.  
China Indonesia Relations 
Indonesia has had diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China for 60 
years. However, diplomatic relations between China and Indonesia were suspended 
for 25 years as a result of the anti-communist backlash after the 30 September 1965 
coup that saw between 800, 000 and one million communist sympathisers killed. 
China was accused of being involved in the plot.146  Relations were re-established in 
1990 and have grown quickly in areas covering politics, trade and culture. The main 
area is reciprocal trade. In 2009, Indonesia – China trade was valued at $US28.3 
billion.147  In 2007, China and Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
China to assist Indonesia to develop its military industrial capability especially in the 
area of shipbuilding.148  In January 2008, the two countries agreed to joint production 
of military transport vehicles and aircraft and NORINCO (China) and PT Pindad 
(Indonesia) agreed to develop rocket launchers and ammunition for them.149  China 
agreed to supply Indonesia with C 802 anti ship missiles for its fast attack boats and 
this is linked to the China – ASEAN Free Trade Agreement CAFTA.150  The TNI and 
PLA Cooperation Committee was formed as well to coordinate military exercises and 
training. This committee has not progressed very far and nothing has come of it so 
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far. In 2010, Indonesia and China signed an Action Plan for Strategic Partnership that 
is again focused on the economy, trade, culture and education.  China has agreed to 
invest more in Indonesia to help it build up its infrastructure. An example of Chinese 
investment is the Suramandu Bridge, which is a joint Indonesia – China project.151  
While Indonesia and China appear to have close relations Indonesia is not balancing 
or bandwagoning with China. The relationship is centred on Indonesia’s national 
interests and as a reaction to the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, and the 2008 Global 
Economic Crisis that China has weathered well. Indonesia has followed its foreign 
policy of being free and active and centred on ASEAN and the UN.   
Indonesia is still concerned at the changes in international and regional power 
structures. In East Asia the rise of China is of the most concern and uncertainty over 
what China’s rise will mean for Asia – Pacific security. Indonesia does not see China 
as a threat but does have concerns over how it intends to use its increased military 
capabilities to achieve its national objectives in the region.152  Indonesia claims the 
Natuna Islands an archipelago of 200 islands in Riau Province 800 miles north of 
Jakarta. The Natuna Islands EEZ contains off shore energy fields of 46 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas. China has an issue with Indonesia’s EEZ claim and a 1993 
Chinese map shows China’s overlapping claim. Indonesia held a major exercise in 
the Natuna Islands area in 1996 as a sign that it is prepared to defend its sovereignty 
over the area.153  In 2009, Indonesia arrested 75 Chinese fishermen in the area. 
China protested and claimed that the fishermen were in a traditional fishing ground. 
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China’s reaction caused concern in Jakarta.154  Incidents such as the Chinese 
reaction to the arrest of its fisherman have reinforced the need for Indonesia to 
enhance its navy’s capability. Indonesia knows that the TNI is no match for the PLAN 
or PLAAF and hedges its security by maintaining a good relationship with the US 
while maintaining the principles of its foreign policy. 
United States Indonesia Relations 
The US has had a long but not always smooth relationship with Indonesia. The US 
sees Indonesia as an important emerging power that sits astride critical Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC) for trade and the movement of energy supplies to the Asia – 
Pacific region. Post 9/11 Indonesia is seen as important in the Global War on Terror 
because Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and home to terrorist 
organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) that is linked to Al Qaeda who is a direct threat to 
the US.155  Between 1965 and 1991 the US was Indonesia’s largest source of 
economic aid and a key patron for the TNI as a source of equipment, training and 
aid.156  This relationship broke down in 1991 as a result of the Dili massacre in which 
the TNI killed 271 unarmed East Timorese in Dili. The US Congress limited IMET 
funding for the TNI. In 1997-98, the US tried to place pressure on President Soeharto 
to initiate political reform, which he resisted and this led to the International Monetary 
Fund withholding loans from Indonesia that contributed to the Indonesian economy 
crashing in 1998. In 1999, the TNI was again implicated in atrocities in East Timor 
that led to the death of 1,500 people and the displacement of 240,000 people. The 
outcome was the Leahy Amendment that completely cut military assistance to 
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Indonesia and further delayed rapprochement.157  The US did not recommence 
military aid to Indonesia on a limited basis until 2002. The Under Secretary for 
Defence, Paul Wolfowitz was eager to restore relations with Indonesia as a counter 
weight to China and used the Global War on Terror as a reason to re-engage 
Indonesia.158  The 26 January 2004 tsunami military support to Indonesia was used to 
further reopen engagement with Indonesia. The US provided $US1 million in spare 
parts for Indonesia’s C130 aircraft fleet.159  In 2005, the embargo on arms sales to 
Indonesia was fully lifted and military relations were normalized.160  Since this period 
military to military relations have increased. During a visit to Indonesia in 2006 
Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice put forward the idea of a strategic partnership to 
promote stability in Asia. The Obama Administration followed up this policy and 
President Obama signed a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement with Indonesia 
during his November 2010 visit to Indonesia.161  The US has conducted over 140 
exercises with the TNI and the TNI participates in the annual multi-lateral Cobra Gold 
Exercise. In June 2010, a Defence Framework Agreement was signed that covers 
security dialogue, education and training, maritime security and equipment.162  The 
military relationship between Indonesia and the US is much closer than that between 
Indonesia and China. Indonesia has stopped short of an alliance agreement and 
bandwagoning with the US but is hedging by pursuing an enhanced military 
relationship. While the relationship has got closer with the US Indonesia does not fully 
trust the US nor support all of its activities. Indonesia is wary of relying on the US for 
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military equipment and Russia is its main supplier of military equipment.163  Indonesia 
also opposed the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and sees these as attacks on 
Muslim countries.164  While Indonesia has plans to enhance the TNI it still relies on 
the US to help maintain security in the Asia – Pacific and hedge against the uncertain 
rise of China. 
Indonesian Defence Force 
The focus of the TNI has been the Army because of Indonesia’s main threat from 
internal security threats caused by separatist movement such as GAM and the OPM. 
The Dwifungsi ABRI system of the dual socio/political function of the Army has 
reinforced this priority to maintain national cohesion. Consequently, the Indonesian 
Navy and the Air Force have suffered under investment in new ships and aircraft and 
the maintenance of the present fleets. In June 2009, President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono ordered a review of the serviceability of military equipment after four fatal 
crashes involving TNI transport aircraft. The review found that 62% of Army vehicles, 
31% of aircraft and 17% of navy vessels were serviceable.165  Defence White Papers 
in 2003 and 2008 called for modernization of the TNI. Law No 17/2007 laid down a 
long-term development plan to improve defence capability between 2005 and 2025. 
In the period 2005 – 2019 the TNI is to achieve minimal essential force to guarantee 
the attainment of immediate defence interests.166  The 2010 Defence Budget is 
$US4.5 billion and sees an increase in defence expenditure from 0.9% to 2% of GDP. 
The ultimate intent is for the TNI to catch up with the Malaysian, Singaporean and 
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Thai Armed Forces and to protect economic and commercial interests.167  While 
China is not mentioned by definition the planned modernization would assist in 
countering Chinese claims to the Indonesian EEZ. Indonesia is also enhancing its 
defence industries to make it more self sufficient in weapons, aircraft and ship 
manufacture.168  While Indonesia is hedging with the US and following a Liberal 
Institutional approach through ASEAN and the UN it is still attempting what Realists 
would term self-help to enhance its security. 
The Army remains the largest force with 330,000 Regular troops and 40,000 
Reservists. The Army is broken into 12 regional commands termed KODAMs. The 
KODAM is broken down into Resort Military Commands (KODIM) and District 
Commands (KORAMIL). These commands parallel the regional and local government 
organization. In 2000 reformists in Indonesia sort to breakdown the KODAM 
system169 as part of defence reforms to remove the TNI from politics as part of the 
development of a liberal democratic government in Indonesia. However, while the 
military positions in parliament have been removed the KODAMs remain and two 
more are planned one in Papua and one in West Kalimantan.170  The KODAMs are 
still seen as important for internal security and intelligence collection. The Army has 
new SS2 Rifles but most of their major equipment such as tanks are old AMX13 light 
tanks whose production was stopped in 1986. The Army requires major expenditure 
on new equipment but the focus is still internal security and peace keeping. 
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The Indonesian Air Force has 30,000 personnel split into two commands. Most of its 
aircraft are aged between 25 to 40 years old and are in poor condition.171  The 
Defence White Papers have reinforced the need for the Indonesia Air Force to 
upgrade its aircraft. The interceptor squadrons have old US F-16A and B and F-5E 
fighter aircraft. The US Air Force did a survey of these aircraft in June 2010 and a 
Framework Agreement on Cooperative Activity in the Field of Defence was signed as 
a result.172  The ground attack squadrons have HAWK 209 and 109 aircraft and 
Su27SKM and Su30MK/MK2 aircraft.  There is reporting that Indonesia intends to buy 
F-16 and C130J aircraft using the US Foreign Military Finance system. This would 
allow the air force to modernize at least cost. The Military Technology journal reported 
that Indonesia has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with South Korea to 
develop a 4.5 Generation stealth jet fighter the KX-F. The plan is to buy 50 aircraft 
that will have similar specifications to the F-16 Block 50 aircraft.173  This diversification 
in military equipment supply is in line with Indonesia’s non-aligned policy and the hard 
lesson of the six years US arms embargo on Indonesia.  
The Indonesian Navy has 75,000 personnel. The navy has 29 principal surface 
combatant made up of eight frigates, 21 corvettes and 41 patrol boats and coastal 
combatants supported by 28 logistic and support vessels.174  The bulk of the vessels 
date back to the 1950s and 1960s and there is a serious problem with a lack of 
weapons and support equipment. The navy has two CAKRA Class (Type 209) 
submarines that were meant to be replaced by two Russian submarines under a 
$US1 billion credit line but this offer was withdrawn by Russia. The CAKRA Class are 
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to be refurbished by Daewoo in South Korea.175  The Defence White Papers and 
procurement plans called for the acquisition of 60 ships but only 15 have been 
procured in the last four years. Even this growth and the refurbishment of the CAKRA 
class submarines indicate that Indonesia is serious about protecting its maritime EEZ 
and resources.  Singapore is one of Indonesia’s closest neighbours but unlike 
Indonesia Singapore has enjoyed a good relationship with the US since its 
independence while at the same time engaging China to each others mutual 
economic benefit. 
  
SINGAPORE AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY 
Singapore is a city-state on an island of some 660 square kilometres with a 
population of 5.077 million people located at a critical sea lines of communication 
geostrategic point in SEA. It is, “a Chinese Island in a sea of Malays”.176  Singapore 
gained independence in 1965 after an acrimonious separation from the Malaysian 
Federation. Singapore’s independence was marked by uncertainty and threatening 
behaviour by its closest neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia.  Singapore’s geographic 
location, lack of natural resources and ethnicity has shaped its foreign policy and its 
defence policy. Both its foreign and defence policy rest on the Realist International 
Relations School and is overlaid with a Constructivist approach to international 
relations.  Since the mid the early 21st Century Singapore’s approach to foreign and 
defence policy has been complicated by the uncertain rise of China and the move 
towards a multi polar world.  Singapore has reinforced its relationship with the US in 
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an attempt to maintain the status quo in the Asia-Pacific. Concurrently, Singapore 
maintains a balanced relationship with China as part of its hedging strategy. The 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is among the largest and most capable in the Asia-
Pacific as a result of US military and technical aid.  Singapore is not balancing with its 
ASEAN partners against China but pursuing a combination of bandwagoning with the 
US and hedging to avoid China seeing Singapore as a threat to its security. 
 
Foreign Policy and Defence Policy 
Singapore’s foreign policy can be divided into two periods: the Cold War survival 
period and the post survival period since 1991. In the Cold War period Singapore’s 
focus was survival, national security and economic development without external 
interference. This was a reaction to Singapore’s initial poor relations with Malaysia 
and Indonesia and Super Power conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Singapore had a 
Hobbesian approach to security in an anarchic world and wanted to focus on 
consolidating its domestic position, resolving domestic issues and enhancing its 
economy, political and security strength.177  Singapore was one of the founding 
members of ASEAN in 1967 that was formed to increase regional cooperation to 
avoid becoming a victim of Super Power rivalry.178  Singapore also saw the founding 
principles of ASEAN as supporting its focus on political and economic survival.  The 
threads of the Cold War period have followed through into the post-Cold War period. 
ASEAN and its supporting fora is the cornerstone of Singapore’s foreign policy. 
Singapore sees ASEAN as a successful organisation for maintaining stability and 
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regional security. ASEAN is seen as providing a multi-layered approach to security. 
The Shangri La Dialogue provides the first level. ARF provides a forum for 
consultation but avoids being seen as a military alliance.179  ASEAN and EAS provide 
another level according to Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Teo Chee 
Hean.180  Singapore’s main foreign policy focus remains building and developing its 
economy in a stable security environment built on the concept of the sanctity of the 
sovereign state. Singapore’s defence policy supports its foreign policy but is still 
Realist based.   
Singapore’s security was initially guaranteed by the presence of Commonwealth 
troops, which had redeployed to Singapore from Malaya on Malaysia’s independence. 
This situation changed in 1968 with the change in British Defence policy which saw all 
British forces withdrawn to the west of the Suez Canal. While the Five Power Defence 
Arrangement signed in 1971 between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and 
Singapore, Singapore sort to use self-help in line with its Realist approach to foreign 
affairs to ensure its own security.  The Nixon Doctrine of 1972 and the United State’s 
failure in South Viet Nam reinforced Singapore’s need to ensure its own security and 
a regionalist approach to foreign policy. This approach to defence policy is still 
reflected in Singapore’s approach to defence. Singapore’s present defence policy 
rests on the twin pillars of diplomacy and deterrence. Diplomacy seeks to develop 
and maintain good relations with other countries. Deterrence seeks to deter threats 
and to contribute to regional resilience.181 Singapore’s deterrence is designed to 
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make it a “poisoned shrimp” for any potential aggressor to swallow.182  Deterrence is 
supported by the concept of Total Defence that is made up of psychological defence, 
social defence, civil defence and military defence. Military defence is based on 
maintaining strong conventional war fighting capability to ensure that its military 
defence stays strong.183  While Singapore’s diplomatic rhetoric supports ASEAN for 
security it sees the security landscape as uncertain. The  Singapore Defence White 
Paper states that the end of the Cold War did not see the end of conflict.184  The US, 
China and Japan relationship is seen by Singapore as the key factor in determining 
the Asia-Pacific security climate. Lee Kuan Yew, the Minister Mentor has stated, 
“China will cause a major displacement in the balance of power when she finally 
arrives as a major player on the world scene”. 185 The US presence in Asia is seen by 
Singapore vital to balancing the rise of China and keeping Japan in its place. 
Singapore’s defence policy helps to explain its close relationship with the US and the 
maintenance of a strong defence force for deterrence and as part of Total Defence. 
While Singapore has reservations about what China’s rise will mean for Asia-Pacific 
security it maintains good relations with China. 
China and Singapore Relations  
The Singaporean population is 74.1% Chinese186 and it has good relations with both 
China and Taiwan. Having said that Singapore only established diplomatic relations 
with China on the 3rd of October 1990 having had informal trade relations since the 
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1970s.187  Singapore’s relationship with Taiwan has caused problems with China. In 
2004, Deputy Premier Lee Hsien Loong visited Taiwan and China reacted by 
protesting and admonishing the Singapore Government and postponing a free trade 
agreement with Singapore.188 Singapore reacted by reiterating that it fully supported 
the “One China” policy and that it would cut relations with Taiwan if it declared 
independence. Since 2004, Singapore – China relations have continued to grow. 
Singapore and China signed the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement in 2008. 
Singapore was the first Asian country to sigh a free trade agreement with China.189  
China is now Singapore’s third largest trading partner.190  Singapore has also sort to 
get China more engaged with ASEAN as part of its diplomatic policy to increase 
Chinese interdependence with ASEAN countries. The Joint Council for Bilateral 
Cooperation (JCBC) was established in 2003 to manage the China – Singapore 
bilateral relationship. In 2008 the Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security 
Cooperation was signed between Singapore and China. This defence relationship 
has sort to coordinate relations that deal with counter proliferation, WMD, terrorism 
and maritime security. In 2010, the SAF and PLA held a joint counter terrorism 
exercise, Exercise Cooperation 2010. The JCBC and defence cooperation are part of 
Singapore’s hedging security policy that seeks to further economic relations and 
manage defence relations in a controlled way. Singapore is against containment of 
China because it thinks that such a policy would heighten Chinese insecurity and 
                                               
187 Brief Introduction to Relations between China and Singapore, Xinhau, 17 May 2002, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-05/17content_397952.htm accessed 18 February 2011. 
188 Simon S.C. Tay (2010), Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post-Crisis Divide from America, Singapore,Wiley,  
p149. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs : Singapore – China Relations, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/text/index.html 
accessed 11 January 2011. 
 73 
could cause a nationalist backlash that would destabilise Asia.191  Consequently, 
engagement is seen as the best policy. However, Singapore is still concerned at what 
the rise of China will mean for Asia-Pacific security. Minister for Defence, Teo Chee 
Hean warned China at the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue that it had to be more 
transparent when it came to military capability and intent as part of the conference 
theme of military transparency.192  During the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue Teo Chee 
Hean stated that China’s weight had grown and that this was causing strategic 
uncertainty because countries did not know whether China would be status quo or 
revisionist.193  While Singapore appears friendly with China it clearly has concerns 
over how China will employ its increasing military capability given overlapping and 
conflicting territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. To ensure that 
deterrence continues to work as part of its hedging policy Singapore has enhanced its 
political, economic and military relationship with the US.  
 
United States and Singapore Relations 
The US has had diplomatic relations with Singapore since its independence in 1965. 
The US is the largest foreign investor in Singapore and is the US’s 13th largest trading 
partner. While 6.5% of Singapore’s exports go to the US.194   Singapore seeks to 
maintain the security status quo in SEA and sees the US as critical in achieving this 
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objective.195  The US presence allows Indonesia’s assertiveness to be offset, Japan’s 
remilitarisation to be held in check and for China’s ambitions in the South China Sea 
to be managed.196   The withdrawal of US forces from Subic Bay and Clark Air Force 
Base in the Philippines as a result of pressure from the Philippines political left 
concerned Singapore. Singapore saw possible US withdrawal from South East Asia 
as a threat to the region’s security. Consequently, Singapore signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the US in 2000 to allow the US station its Commander of 
Logistics Group Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC) at Sembawang Port and for 
US warships to use its port facilities.  This included a deep-water port capable of 
taking an aircraft carrier. COMLOG WESTPAC is the logistics command for the US 
7th Fleet that is based in Japan and is responsible for the security of Asia Pacific sea 
lines of communication and operations against North Korea should it attack South 
Korea. The MOU also gave US fighter squadrons access to Singapore Air Force 
bases. 
 
In 2005, Singapore and the US signed a Strategic Framework Agreement that further 
develops the US/Singapore security MOU.  The MOU builds on earlier agreements. 
The MOU increases defence cooperation through the provision of facilities in 
Singapore for US military vessels, aircraft, personnel, equipment and material 
supporting deployments of the Parties respective forces. It allows for exchanges 
between defence intelligence and security agencies and other cooperation as the 
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Parties may agree in the future.197  Singapore has stopped at the security agreement 
and not signed a formal security treaty.198  This is to ensure that the US does not 
overwhelm Singapore with its presence as has happened in South Korea and Japan 
(witness on-going Japanese issues with US Forces in Okinawa). The other reason is 
that Singapore does not want to be seen as balancing with the US, which would be 
interpreted by China as an alliance against it. Singapore has chosen to use the US to 
hedge against the rise of a more revisionist and aggressive China. This allows 
Singapore to assist the US to maintain a presence in South East Asia while still being 
able to have a relationship and trade with China. The SAF plays a significant part in 
the relationship with the US and by ensuring that Singapore maintains a credible 
deterrence force. 
 
Singapore Armed Forces 
Singapore’s Armed Forces are based on a combination of the Swiss and Israeli 
defence models. Israeli advisors were attached to the SAF in its formative years to 
provide advice on organisation, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures.  
Consequently, the SAF is a National Service defence force. The National Service 
approach is evidenced by the ratio of regular force to reservists in the SAF. The RF 
component of the SAF is 73000 strong while the reserve component is 312000 
strong.199  The mission of the SAF is to deter and defend Singapore against threats to 
its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.200   Using the Realist model 
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Singapore has based its defence on self-help and this means that it has a balanced 
defence force which has all of the capabilities required to ensure its immediate 
security. Singapore spends 4.7% of its GDP which equates to $US7.5 billion on 
defence annually.201  The SAF is one of the most modern and advanced armed 
forces in SEA. The SAF is now moving into the 3rd Generation SAF, which has seen 
the creation of five new commands, modernization of the information technology 
networking of units for combined and joint operations and focus on preparing 
personnel for non traditional operations.  The Singaporean Army has a strength of 
40,000 personnel and is organised into two People’s Defence Force Commands for 
coastal and installation defence, two Army Operational Reserve Divisions and three 
Regular Force combined arms divisions. The Singaporean Army is equipped with the 
most modern command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
systems. Its armaments are modern and well maintained making it a formidable force 
in SEA.202  The role of the Singapore Air Force is to protect the integrity of 
Singapore’s air space, defend against air threats and protect access to air and sea 
lines of communication.203  The Singaporean Air Force is equipped with modern US 
aircraft including F-5S (upgraded to F-16 avionics), F-16C/D and F-15SG aircraft. 
Singapore has two fighter/ground attack squadrons located in the US at Mountain 
Home Air Force Base (AFB) in Idaho and Luke and Cannon AFB. This deployment 
further indicates the closeness of the Singapore defence relationship with the US. 
The Singapore Navy has 4,000 personnel and is also well equipped and capable. The 
Navy’s role is to protect Singapore’s territorial waters and keep sea lines of 
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communication open. To add to the combat power of its surface fleet made up of 
Formidable class frigates and Victory class corvettes and Fearless class anti 
submarine patrol boats Singapore has four Challenger (ex SJOORMEN Class) patrol 
submarines and two Archer (Swedish VASTERGOTLAND class) patrol 
submarines.204  The SAF exercises with the US and other regional navies to enhance 
its operational effectiveness. While Singapore is not part of a formal military alliance 
balancing against China it has achieved this in a virtual way by hedging and almost 
bandwagoning with the US and key western armed forces in the region. In contrast 
the Philippines has sort to reinvigorate its close military relationship with the US while 
keeping its options open with China mainly for economic advantage. It military forces 
have been focused on internal security operations and are not capable of countering 
a threat from China.    
 
PHILIPPINES AND SOUTH EAST ASIAN SECURITY 
 
 
The Philippines gained its independence from the United States in 1946 after being a 
colony of the US since 1898. The US influence on the Philippines remained high until 
the fall of Ferdinand Marcus and the resulting desire for the Philippines to exert its 
independence. The Philippines is the only ASEAN country to have a treaty level 
military alliance with the US. The Philippines is one of the founding members of 
ASEAN and its principles form the cornerstone of Philippines foreign policy. The 
Philippines has spent the last five decades fighting insurgencies within its own 
country and defeating these has been the focus of its defence policy and structure. 
However, conflict with China over the Spratly Islands and the growth of terrorism after 
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the 9/11 attacks on the US has changed the Philippines defence policy and led again 
to a closer relationship with the US. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are 
centred on the Army due to their internal security focus. New threats have highlighted 
the need for the Philippines to invest more in the Philippines Navy and Air Force but 
this has not occurred. To ensure its security the Philippines is hedging through 
ASEAN and balancing with the US through the 1952 Mutual Defence Treaty. 
 
Philippines Foreign and Defence Policy 
 
The principles of Philippines foreign policy are laid down in its 1987 Philippines 
Constitution. The three pillars of Philippines foreign policy are: preservation and 
enhancement of national security, promotion and attainment of economic security and 
protection of the rights and promotion of the welfare and interest of Filipinos 
overseas. These pillars are supported by the eight foreign policy realities and the key 
ones are: China, Japan, and the United States and their relationship will be a 
determining influence in the security situation and economic evolution of East Asia, 
Philippines foreign policy decisions have to be made in the context of ASEAN, the 
international Islamic community will continue to be important for the Philippines, the 
coming years will see the growing importance of multilateral and inter-regional 
organisations to promote common interests, and as an archipelagic state, the defence 
of the nation’s sovereignty and the protection of its environment and natural 
resources can be carried out to the extent that it asserts its rights over the maritime 
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territory and gets others to respect those rights.205  Article II Section 7 of the 
constitution states that the Philippines, rejects war as an instrument of national policy 
and supports international law and policy of peace, equality and justice. To achieve its 
foreign policy objectives the Philippines relies heavily on ASEAN and its success as 
an organization. The original principles of ASEAN to accelerate economic growth, 
social progress and to promote regional peace and development are reflected in the 
Philippines constitution.206 In 2008, the Philippines ratified the ASEAN Charter to 
further reinforce this belief. However, as with all SEA countries the Philippines has 
been concerned at the economic and military rise of China and China’s more 
aggressive approach to contested areas in the Spratly Islands. The Philippines has 
tried to deal with China through ASEAN and the United Nations. The ASEAN – China 
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity has become the 
regional context for dealing with China.207  The Philippines attempts to have the 
South China Sea disputes discussed in the UN were blocked by China.208  The 
reaction to the 1995 South China Sea incident and the lack of the ability of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to counter the Chinese caused the Philippines to 
review its defence policy and capabilities. 
 
In 1998, the Philippines published its Philippines Defence Policy Paper. Philippines 
Defence policy is anchored in the 1987 Philippines Constitution and the principles in 
the constitution flow through to the White Paper. The White Paper acknowledged that 
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the external defence of the Philippines had been neglected as a result of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) being focused on internal counter insurgency 
operations. This imbalanced needed to be addressed if the Philippines were to be 
able to defend its sovereignty. The White Paper laid down the national defence 
objectives as: secure and uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines, 
protect and defend Philippines national territory against external aggression and 
Philipino communities against internal armed threats; safeguard Filipino lives and 
property during times of crisis and calamities here and abroad, and support the 
national government’s efforts toward the attainment of political stability, economic 
development and social cohesion.209  The policy paper’s approach to achieving the 
defence goals was defence self-reliance and cooperation. This approach 
acknowledged that for the Philippines to maintain its freedom it would have to 
become more self - reliant and use the Realist concept of self-help to achieve it. 
However, the second part of the approach, defence cooperation acknowledged that in 
some circumstances the threat would be too large for the AFP to deal with. In these 
situation treaties such as the one between the Philippines and the US would need to 
be invoked. A Joint Defence Assessment (JDA) conducted by the US Department of 
Defence and staff from the US Pacific Command followed up the White Paper. The 
JDA sort to develop a plan for Philippines defence reform and a road map to 
implement it. The JDA has become the basis for the Philippine Defence Reform 
Program. The Philippines defence policy indicates that the Philippines has adopted a 
policy of hedging to meet its security needs by planning to increase its defence 
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capability but at the same time emphasizing its need to be able to call on other states 
for assistance namely the US through its formal alliance. 
 
 
China - Philippines Relations  
 
The Philippines established diplomatic relations with China in 1975. This recognition 
was mainly brought about by the Philippines desire to stop Chinese support for the 
Philippines Communist Party and its insurgency against the government.210  The 
Philippines relationship with China is now, primarily based on trade and investment. 
Bilateral trade between the Philippines and China amounted to $US20 billion in 2009 
and China is the Philippines third largest trading partner. The Philippines military 
interaction with China is insignificant and is set to remain this way. Since 2005, the 
Philippines political relationship with China has increased. This engagement has been 
within the ASEAN framework that seeks to bring China into the region as an active 
member and responsible partner. This approach seeks to get China to sign up to 
ASEAN’s principles and the concept of SEA as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOFPAN).211  Since 2001 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has visited 
China 10 times to promote bilateral relations. Premier Zhu Rongji visited the 
Philippines in 1999 and President Hu Jintao visited in 2005 and Premier We Jiabao 
visited in 2007. In October 2009, the Philippines and China signed a five year Joint 
Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation. This plan, focuses on political, economic and 
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trade, cultural and people to people relationships.212  The agreement does not 
increase Philippines/China military relationships. The Philippines is happy to increase 
contact, which meets its political aims of furthering ASEAN soft power security 
objectives and more importantly its economic national interests. The Philippines 
remains deeply suspicious of China’s intent in the South China Sea and its present 
“charm offensive”.213  
 
Despite increased diplomatic contact the Philippines remains concerned over the 
uncertainty surrounding the rise of China as a regional and world power. The 
Philippines and China have competing claims over the Spratly Islands and the 
resulting EEZ (see Appendix 1 for detail of the areas claimed by the Philippines). 
These competing claims have led to conflict between the two countries. In 1995, the 
Philippines discovered an increased Chinese presence on the Mischief Reef and 
reacted by deploying the Republic of Philippines Navy that proved no match for the 
Chinese.214  This was the first attack on an ASEAN member state by China. A clash 
over the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) occurred in 1997 in which the 
Philippines prevailed. In 2002, the Philippines security forces arrested 160 Chinese 
fishermen for illegally fishing areas of the Spratly Is EEZ. China reacted angrily and 
demanded their release.215  The 1995 incident led to China and the Philippines 
signing an agreement in 2000 and ultimately to the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in 
the South China Sea in 2002. The main lesson of the 1995 incident was that the 
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Philippines needed to review its defence policy and to reinvigorate its defence 
relationship with the US. China sees the Philippines increased military contact with 
the US as a threat to its aspirations for hegemony in the region.216  The Philippines 
does not want to be forced into bandwagoning with China to maintain its sovereignty. 
To hedge against a more aggressive posture by China the Philippines is balancing 
with the US. 
 
Philippines - United States Relations 
 
The Philippines was ceded to the United States by Spain in 1898 under the terms of 
the Treaty of Paris. The Philippines remained an American colony until it became a 
self-governing commonwealth in 1935 under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.217  In 1946, 
the Philippines gained fully independence from the US. Between 1947 and 1992 the 
US maintained two major bases in the Philippines at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. 
The 1952 Philippines and US Mutual Defence Treaty further cemented the 
US/Philippines defence relationship. The fall of Ferdinand Marcos and the restoration 
of democracy to the Philippines result in a backlash against the US by nationalists 
and the left wing. Consequently, in 2001 the Philippines Senate rejected the 1991 US 
Bases Treaty and the US was forced to close Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. This 
represented a low point in US/Philippines defence relations, which was not to last 
long. The 1995 Spratly Island incident with China and the coming to power of 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo marked a turning point in the US defence 
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relationship. The Philippines saw that China was prepared to act unilaterally to pursue 
its claims on the Spratly Islands. The continued economic and military growth of 
China meant that this potential for aggressive action would continue to be present. 
The AFP had proved that they could not deal with such a threat to the Philippines 
sovereignty. While the Philippines had always acknowledged the importance of the 
US presence in SEA to deter Chinese aggression it saw the need to reinvigorate its 
relationship with the US. In 1998 the Philippines passed a Visiting Forces Agreement 
with the US that saw resumption in US Navy ship visits and combined military 
exercises. The period 1999 – 2000, saw US carrier battle groups conduct two 
exercises off Palawan near the Spratly Island Group and in 2001-2004 Exercise 
Balikatan was conducted in the South China Sea.218  The Philippines interpretation of 
the 1952 Mutual Defence Treaty is that an attack on the Philippines over the Spratly 
Islands will constitute an attack on the US. The US debates this interpretation but it 
demonstrates that the Philippines is balancing with the US and hedging at the same 
time. This concept is consistent with the Philippines defence policy of self - reliance 
and cooperation.  
 
US/Philippines defence relations have been further forced to converge with the 
advent of the Global War on Terrorism as a result of the Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks on the 
Twin Towers in New York.  To assist the Philippines to counter terrorist groups based 
in the Philippines the US has established the Joint US Military Assistance Group in 
Manila and Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P). JSOTF-P 
has task forces deployed to Mindinao, Sulu and Archipelago. The main force of 400 
US military personnel is based in Western Mindanao Command to assist the AFP 
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counter the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist groups. The US 
JSOTF-P mission is to provide advice to the AFP and not to conduct operations itself. 
The Philippines further demonstrated support for the US by supporting the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and contributed a small AFP contingent. The Philippines is the US 
12th highest recipient of US Foreign Military Funding and in 2007 the US provided the 
AFP with $US76 million in equipment and services funding. While the Philippines 
aspires to self help in the military area it is clear that it still heavily relies on the US for 
military assistance and guarantees for its security both internally and externally 
 
Philippines Armed Forces 
 
The 1998 White Paper acknowledged that the Philippines had been involved in 
counter insurgency operations for 50 years and that its focus had been on internal 
security at the expense of external security. The Philippines lack of ability to deal 
independently with an external threat to its sovereignty was reinforced by the Spratly 
Islands incident with China in 1995. Building on the 1998 Defence White Paper and 
the US/Philippines Joint Defence Assessment the AFP has developed a Defence 
Reform Programme (DFP). The DFP seeks to develop the capability of the AFP in 
three phases. Phase One from 2006 to 2011, seeks to enhance capabilities to 
conduct internal security operations. This phase will see the acquisition of new 
helicopters, trucks, patrol boats, rifles and radios plus an infantry battalion upgrade 
programme. Phase Two from 2012 – 2017, will see a build up in territorial defence 
and Phase Three from 2018 – 2023, will see further enhancement of territorial 
defence and peacekeeping capabilities. To guarantee its ability to defend its territory 
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the AFP will need to develop its air and maritime capabilities.219  The Philippines are 
broken into seven joint regional unified commands. The unified commands have 
operational authority over all land, naval and air forces in their area of 
responsibility.220  The Land Forces have nine infantry divisions and a tenth infantry 
division is being raised in the Mindanao Region. The focus of the Land Forces is 
internal security operations in line with the DRP/ Capability Upgrade Programme 
(CUP).  
The Philippines Navy is made up of one US Cannon Class Frigate, two Rizal Class 
Corvettes, two Cebu Class Corvettes and 28 patrol vessels.221  While the Philippines 
Navy can deal with internal security tasks and EEZ fisheries patrols it is not capable 
of defending the Philippines sovereignty in the South China Sea. The Navy would be 
able to act as a trip wire to provoke an international reaction if the Philippines 
sovereignty was attacked by a foreign power. The Philippines is still reliant on the US 
Navy and the 7th Fleet for maritime protection. The CUP recognizes that for the 
Philippines to have defence self-reliance it will need to increase its capability 
significantly.222 The 1998 Defence White Paper indicated that the Philippines Navy 
would need three frigates, six corvettes, 24 patrol craft, 16 patrol boats, 12 off shore 
patrol vessels and three mine warfare vessels to replace and enhance the present 
fleet.223  Even with these increases the Philippines Navy will still need support from 
the 7th Fleet.  
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The Republic of the Philippines Air Force (RPAF) has also been focused on counter 
insurgency operations. The Philippines Air Force had F-5A fighter aircraft on is 
organization for battle but these were decommissioned in 2005. The RPAF has an air 
base on Kalayaan Island in the Spratly Islands that demonstrates its determination to 
defend its sovereignty. The 5th Fighter Wing has 15 S-211 aircraft and the 15th Strike 
Wing has 24 OV-10 Bronco aircraft and 24 MG520 aircraft. The 1998 Defence White 
Paper again recognized the weakness of the RPAF and it recommended the 
acquisition of 36 multi-role fighter aircraft, 24 surface attack aircraft and six long-
range patrol aircraft.224 According to the IISS Military Balance 2010 the RPAF plans 
to acquire combat aircraft in 2012 – 13.225 Given the present economic down turn the 
CPU appears to have stalled. No orders have been placed for fighter aircraft to 
replace the F-5 fighter fleet as reported in The Military Balance 2010.226 Ian Storey, a 
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies claims that due to the present 
financial downturn that it is unlikely that the Philippines will be able to fund its defence 
procurement programme in the foreseeable future. And that this is why no major 
equipment orders have been confirmed227 The Philippines will continue to rely on 
hedging using ASEAN and balancing with the US to protect its sovereignty and its 
Spratly Islands claims.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The economic and military rise of China and its assertive approach to claims over the 
South China Sea are causing security uncertainty among Asia-Pacific countries. The 
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ASEAN countries are primarily focused on growing their economies, developing 
infrastructure and creating social and ethnic cohesion within young and immature 
democratic states. The Philippines and Indonesia still have significant internal security 
threats from separatists and terrorist groups to deal with. All of the countries 
considered have overlapping and conflicting claims to territory and maritime areas 
within the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands that affect their relations with each 
other and with China. The Asia-Pacific countries are relying, in the main, on the US to 
maintain the status quo in the Asia-Pacific through its hub and spoke bilateral security 
system and powerful military capability in the region. The ASEAN countries are 
relying on the ASEAN fora and their wider membership to create interdependence in 
the region and to pull China into the community as a responsible actor. On the 
surface the ASEAN countries appear happy with this construct but underneath this 
there lies doubt about China’s true intent. Malaysia, Viet Nam and Indonesia are 
hedging by engaging with China economically for their national interest but avoiding 
getting too close to China militarily and getting closer to the US both economically 
and militarily. The Philippines has a treaty level alliance with the US and is both 
hedging and balancing to address a potential threat from China. Singapore is hedging 
and almost bandwagoning with the US to ensure its security. China’s military 
capability to deny US access to the “first island chain” is now at a stage where the US 
is concerned about its ability to intervene at will in the area and this includes the 
South China Sea. In 2009 and 2010 the Chinese became more assertive and 
aggressive over its claim to the whole South China Sea and now maintains that the 
South China Sea is a “core interest” to China and in the same league as Taiwan, 
Tibet and Xinjiang. The reaction of the ASEAN countries studied in this paper has not 
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been to bandwagon with China. The Obama Administration has sort to emphasis to 
the Asia-Pacific states that in spite of the 2008 economic crisis the US will remain 
engaged in the region and that it will stand up to intimidation by China. Secretary of 
State, Hillary Clinton made this quite clear to the Chinese delegation at the November 
2010 ARF Meeting in Hanoi. The ASEAN countries considered in this paper are not 
actively balancing with the US or each other because they form military agreements 
with the US that fall short of military treaty level alliances. Within ASEAN and the ARF 
a military alliance like NATO has been avoided because of fear that China will 
become alienated and feel directly threatened that could see a Chinese nationalist 
backlash and war. Consequently, no command and control structure exists within 
ASEAN to plan or execute a military campaign to resist Chinese aggression in the 
South China Sea. Any military reaction to open aggression would need to be led by 
the US using the Pacific Command structure and ASEAN countries putting their 
forces under US operational control. ASEAN countries will actively seek to avoid a 
situation requiring such a reaction from occurring and live in hope that the continued 
US presence in the Asia-Pacific will keep China in check. 
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Appendices: 
1. South China Sea Territorial Disputes 
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